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MISSION AND MARKETS IN HEALTH CARE:
PROTECTING ESSENTIAL COMMUNITY
PROVIDERS FOR THE POOR
JOHN V. JACOBI*
Does mission matter? To some, medicine is a profession: while money
changes hands, professional conduct is a thing apart from commerce.' To
others, health care delivery is the exchange of services for payment, a form
of economic exchange that varies from other market transactions only in
minor, largely correctable ways.2 On health care financing, most in both
camps agree: access to health care is sufficiently important, the causes of
illness are sufficiently beyond the control of the ill, that market forces should
not deny the poor access to "at least a basic ration of critically needed health
care."i3
But what of service delivery-or is it caregiving? Does the care provided
by mission-driven providers differ significantly from that provided by
economically driven providers? This question is central to the future of
Medicaid,4 the federal-state health care program that is undergoing a
dramatic conversion to managed care. A decade ago, entrepreneurs saw
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the Seton Hall Health Law & Policy Program. B.A. State University College Of New York at Buffalo,
1981; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1984. I thank Kathleen Boozang, Charles Sullivan, and Michael
Zimmer for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I am also indebted to Michael Fiore of the Health Care
Financing Administration's ("HCFA") Division of Integrated Health Systems and Matthew Barry of
HCFA's Medicaid Managed Care Team for their kind assistance; Russell Coward, of the Center for
Health Policy Research, George Washington University Medical Center, for making available an on-
line version of that organization's excellent research on Medicaid managed-care contracts; and
Onofrio deGennaro for his tireless research assistance.
1. See Edmund D. Pellegrino, Contempo 1996: Ethics, 275 JAMA 1807 (1996); Ezekiel J.
Emanuel & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Preserving the Physician-Patient Relationship in the Era of
Managed Care, 273 JAMA 323 (1995); MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS 152-54
(1993); BRADFORD H. GRAY, THE PROFIT MOTIVE AND PATIENT CARE 4-5 (1991); see also Peter T.
Kilborn, Doctors Organize to Fight Corporate Intrusion, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1997, at A12.
2. See CLARK C. HAVIGHURST, HEALTH CARE CHOICES: PRIVATE CONTRACTS AS
INSTRUMENTS OF HEALTH REFORM 1-3 (1995); Richard Kronick, Managed Competition-Why We
Don't Have It and How We Can Get It, in AMERICAN HEALTH POLICY 44, 48-49 (Robert B. Helms,
ed., 1993); RITA RICARDO-CAMPBELL, THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF HEALTH 328-30 (1982).
3. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Turning Our Gaze From Bread and Circus Games, HEALTH AFF., SPRING
1995, at 33; see Uwe E. Reinhardt, Reflections on the Meaning of Efficiency: Can Efficiency Be
Separated from Equity, 10 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 302 (1992); Mark V. Pauly, Is Medical Care
Different? Old Questions, New Answers, 13 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 227, 235-36 (1988). But see
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MORTAL PERIL, 43-58 (1997).
4. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as amended at Title XIX of the Social Security Act
of 1965,42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (1994).
5. See Joel D. Ferber, Auto-Assignment and Enrollment in Medicaid Managed Care Programs,
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Medicaid services, particularly in primary or comprehensive care, as
providing insufficient remunerative benefits to be worthwhile. As a result,
Medicaid beneficiaries had very limited access to appropriate care.6 Out of
religious 7 or social8 mission, however, a cadre of community health centers
and community-oriented hospitals provided high-quality, culturally sensitive
care to these underserved communities. 9 But mission-driven providers were
few in number, and care unquestionably suffered. Costs continued to rise
although the program increasingly was regarded as failing to provide
adequate health care to the poor.'0
More recently, states, with federal acquiescence, have encouraged
commercial managed-care organizations to take on the care of the poor as a
profit-making venture.' 1 For the states, Medicaid managed care' 2 permits the
24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 99, 99-100 (1996); John Holahan et al., Insuring the Poor Through Section
1115 Medicaid Waivers, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 199, 208. The percentage of the Medicaid
population in managed care has increased from 9.53% in 1991 to 40.10% in 1996. See Health Care
Financing Administration, National Summary of Medicaid Managed Care Programs and Enrollment
(last modified Feb. 26, 1997) <http.//www.hcfa.gov/medicaid/trendsl.html>.
6. See PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM'N, ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 341-42 (1996);
Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid Physician Participation: Patients, Poverty, and Physician Self-Interest,
21 AM. J.L. & MED., 191, 192-93 (1995); PHYSICIAN PAYMENT REVIEW COMM'N, ANNUAL REP. TO
CONGRESS 350-51 (1994); KAREN ERDMAN & SIDNEY M. WOLFE, PUB. CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH
GROUP, POOR HEALTH CARE FOR POOR AMERICANS: A RANKING OF STATE MEDICAID PROGRAMS
73-74 (1988).
7. See Robert Heuer, Preserving the Mission, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 27, 1995, at 19.
8. See Howard Larkin, Community Care Gets Competitive, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 17, 1997, at
7.
9. See Helen Halpin Schauffler & Jessica Wolin, Community Health Clinics under Managed
Competition: Navigating Uncharted Waters, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 461, 462-65 (1996);
STUART H. ALTMAN ET AL., COMPETITION AND COMPASSION: CONFLICTING ROLES FOR PUBLIC
HOSPITALS 202-203 (1989); LARRY S. GAGE Er AL., NATIONAL ASS'N OF PUB. HOSPS., AMERICA'S
URBAN HEALTH SAFETY NET: PRESERVING ACCESS IN THE ERA OF REFORM 64 (1994); Andrew
Bindman, A Public Hospital Closes: Impact on Patients' Access to Care and Health Status, 264
JAMA 2899 (1990); Heuer, supra note 7; Larkin, supra note 8; Kenneth E. Thorpe, Improved Access
to Care for the Uninsured Poor in Large Cities: Do Public Hospitals Make a Difference?, 12 J.
HEALTH POL.'POL'Y & L. 313 (1987).
These institutions do not always act completely selflessly, of course, as evidenced by fierce
struggles over provisions in the Medicaid statute which provide for "reasonable and adequate" hospital
rates, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1994), and full-cost reimbursement to community health centers,
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(E). See, e.g., Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990). These
institutions have suffered a setback in this regard. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 repealed these
rate protections, granting states new "flexibility in payment methods." Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat.
251, §§ 4711-12 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) note (1997)).
10. See Robert J. Blendon et al., Data Watch: Medicaid Beneficiaries and Health Reform,
HEALTH AFF., Spring 1993, at 132, 138-41; see also Watson, supra note 6.
11. See Michael S. Sparer, Medicaid Managed Care and the Health Reform Debate: Lessons
from New York and California, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 433 (1996); Trish Riley, State Health
Reform and the Role of 1115 Waivers, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Spring 1995, at 139; Deborah A.
Freund & Robert E. Hurley, Medicaid Managed Care: Contribution to Issues of Health Reform, 16
ANN. REv. PUB. HEALTH 473 (1995).
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"privatization" of network maintenance and much of the quality control
responsibilities of Medicaid. States convert from Medicaid provider to payor:
they bid out contracts to provide health services to the poor.
States and, at least for the time being, federal regulators 3 are inventing
Medicaid managed care on the fly. They must decide how, if at all, mission-
driven providers will relate to the entrepreneurial enterprises in the new
networks. The states experience considerable tension between controlling
costs and maintaining caring, culturally sensitive provider networks. In
addition, there is tension between the urge to "mainstream" Medicaid
beneficiaries into the commercial health care delivery system, thereby
breaking down a historically two-tiered health care system, and the urge to
support historic "essential community providers"'14 that target the particular
needs of economically disadvantaged patients, needs that are different from
the mainstream.
State and federal regulators have struggled with the place of essential
community providers in Medicaid managed care. Federal law provides little
protection to Medicaid's historic providers in waivered Medicaid managed
care systems. Some states' statutes or regulations, meanwhile, require that
Medicaid-participating managed care organizations include essential
community providers in their networks. 5 Most of the regulatory activity in
this area, however, is informal, as federal officials cajole states to preserve
access to historic Medicaid providers for Medicaid managed care
12. Prior to the passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, state movement of Medicaid
beneficiaries to managed care required a federal waiver from generally applicable Medicaid principles.
HCFA was empowered to grant "programnatic" waivers under § 1915(b) of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1396n (1994), or "demonstration" waivers under § 1115 of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1315 (1994). See Freund & Hurley, supra note 11, at 476-77. In recent years, the Health Care
Financing Administration has granted § 1115 "demonstration waivers" with increasing frequency,
permitting states to experiment with broad reconfigurations of their Medicaid programs, centered
around a shift to managed care. See John Holahan et al., supra note 5; Bruce C. Vladeck, Medicaid
1115 Demonstrations: Progress Through Partnership, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 217. With the
passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, states are permitted to shift most Medicaid beneficiaries
to managed care without obtaining a federal waiver. See Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, §§ 4701-
02 (to be codified at § 42 U.S.C. § 1396(u)(2) (1997)). These amendments to Medicaid obviate the
need for "programmatic" waivers, although "demonstration" waivers remain necessary for more
extensive modifications of a state's Medicaid plan.
13. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 eliminated some, but not all, federal oversight of states'
shift to Medicaid managed care. See supra note 12.
14. The term "essential community provider" is variously defined in statute and regulation. See
infra Part II. For purposes of this article, "essential community provider" is used broadly to mean
organizations, such as community health centers and public and community nonprofit hospitals, that
serve a high proportion of Medicaid and uninsured patients and are devoted to the service of medically
underserved communities. Cf LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:2241-2242 (West 1996).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 110-16, 131-36.
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beneficiaries, 16 and state officials in turn encourage or require that
participating managed care organizations make a place in their networks for
these essential community providers.'7
Should government protect mission-driven providers in the shift to
Medicaid managed care? In part, the answer to this question turns on the
statutory purposes of Medicaid as both a vehicle for providing an opportunity
for the poor to enter the medical mainstream, and as a program to provide
medical care in a setting that includes a wide variety of culturally appropriate
social services. The answer also turns in part on an economic and public
policy analysis of the performance of these mission-driven providers in
comparison with their for-profit counterparts. Part I of this article will
describe the complex mission of Medicaid, as a program that on the one hand
integrates the poor into the mainstream of health care, and on the other hand
provides enhanced, supplementary or remedial care to a population with
different and greater needs. Part I concludes that legislative intent is
insufficiently clear to determine the fate of mission-driven providers. Rather,
their fate must depend on economic and public policy analysis of their effect
on Medicaid beneficiaries' health care. Part II will describe the developing
Medicaid managed care system, and the complex, largely informal
mechanisms by which essential community providers achieve some limited
insulation from competitive forces. Part III will argue that regulatorily
mandated inclusion of essential community providers in Medicaid managed
care networks is appropriate for three reasons. First, mission-driven providers
have in the past and are likely in the future to be willing and able to cost-
shift, providing necessary care to the poor uninsured. Second, information
asymmetries that plague the Medicaid managed-care market can be
ameliorated to some extent by affording special status to historic Medicaid
providers. Third, the nonprofit essential community providers' reliance on
debt financing and donations renders their capital less mobile than that of
their for-profits competitors, who normally rely on equity markets. This
capital immobility lends stability to the provider network for the vulnerable
Medicaid population in the inevitable event of significant funding
contraction.
I. MEDICAID GOALS: MAINSTREAMING OR DECENT MINIMUM
Congress created Medicaid18 in 1965 as a medical insurance program for
16. See infra text accompanying notes 117-31.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 117-31.
18. Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified as amended at Tite XIX of the Social Security Act
[VOL. 75:1431
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the poor. The United States had missed the movement among Western
European countries, which afforded their citizens nearly universal access to
health care by adopting broad social insurance legislation.19 As a result, a
large class of Americans emerged without insurance or the means otherwise
to purchase health care, and who became dependent upon a system of poor
clinics and charity hospitals.20 The poor and non-poor, then, came to rely on
distinct health care systems, and America produced a "dual track" system of
health services: one for those with means, and another, lesser system for
those reliant on a patchwork of private charity or state and local
governmental largess.
2 1
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program created to "provide a more
effective medical assistance program for welfare recipients and to extend
medical assistance to additional persons with low-income."2 Nationally,
Medicaid is the major payor for health care services for the poor and
disabled. By 1996, over thirty-three million persons were enrolled in
Medicaid, well over ten percent of the population.23
Almost from the beginning, Medicaid experienced two problems. First,
the program experienced higher than expected costs due to states'
manipulation of "disproportionate share hospital" payments,24 increases in
the number of people eligible for coverage, and increased per-beneficiary
costs.25 Second, even with the increases in program costs, Medicaid
beneficiaries remained outside the medical mainstream, and continued to be
treated by caregivers dedicated to caring for the poor.26 In recent years, the
of 1965,42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (1994))
19. See WILLIAM A. GLASER, HEALTH INSURANCE IN PRACTICE: INTERNATIONAL VARIATIONS
IN FINANCING, BENEFITS, AND PROBLEMS 5-6 (1991); PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 237-38 (1982).
20. See ROBERT STEVENS & ROSEMARY STEVENS, WELFARE MEDICINE IN AMERICA: A CASE
STUDY OF MEDICAID 16 (1974); RAND E. ROSENBLATT Er AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH
CARE SYSTEM 411-13 (1997).
21. See Rand E. Rosenblatt, Dual Track Health Care-The Decline of the Medicaid Cure, 44 U.
CIN. L. REV. 643, 645 (1975) (book review).
22. Laurens H. Silver & Mark Edelstein, Medicaid: Title X1X of the Social Security Act-A
Review and Analysis-Part 1, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 239 (1970) (footnote omitted) (citing
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION, Supp. D, § 1000).
23. See Health Care Financing Administration, supra note 5; DIANE ROwLAND ET AL, KAISER
COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICAID, MEDICAID AT THE CROSSROADS 5-7 (1992).
24. See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
25. See DAVID LISKA ET AL., KAISER COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICAID, MEDICAID
EXPENDITURES AND BENEFICIARIES: NATIONAL AND STATE PROFILES AND TRENDS, 1984-1993 83-84
(1995); Freund & Hurley, supra note 11; JUDITH FEDER Er AL., KAISER COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF
MEDICAID, THE MEDICAID COST EXPLOSION: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 7-8 (1993).
26. See surpa note 6 and accompanying text
1997] 1435
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nearly universal response of federal and state officials to the dual concerns of
increasing costs and cramped access to medical care has been to move
toward Medicaid managed care. This transformation must be undertaken,
however, in a manner that is consistent with Medicaid's purpose. In
particular, it must interfere with Medicaid beneficiaries' access to essential
community providers only to the extent that such interference comports with
the statutory mission of Medicaid.28
But what is the statutory mission of Medicaid? It is clear that the "general
aim" of Medicaid is to provide a "package of health care services" to eligible
persons and to assure that "individuals will receive necessary medical
care,"29 although the statutory goal clearly falls short of requiring states to
provide all necessary care.30 It is remedial legislation, intended to improve
the second-class system of health care for the poor.
31
Yet such aims do not establish the proper treatment of the "dual system"
of American health care, nor the fate of essential community providers. Does
the statute intend to remedy both the substandard nature of the care and the
segregation of the poor in the delivery of health care, or does a "separate but
adequate" system of health care meet the statutory mandate?32 In other
27. See Colleen M. Grogan, The Medicaid Managed Care Policy Consensus for Welfare
Recipients: A Reflection of Traditional Welfare Concerns, 22 J. HEALTH POL POL'Y & L. 815, 818-19
(1997); John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Medicaid and Managed Care, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1727 (1995); DIANE ROWLAND ET AL., KAISER COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICAID, MEDICAID
AND MANAGED CARE: LESSONS FROM THE LITERATURE 1 (1995); Freund & Hurley, supra note 11, at
474.
28. See Gregg S. Meyer & David Blumenthal, TennCare and Academic Medical Centers: The
Lessons tom Tennessee, 276 JAMA 672 (1996) (citing National Ass'n of Health Ctrs. v. Shalala, No.
1:94CV01238 (D.D.C. filed June 7, 1994)) (challenging the grant of waivers from Medicaid
requirements for reimbursement of and access to community health centers) (complaint dismissed by
plaintiffs); David Burda, Community health group quietly drops Medicaid suit, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Nov. 18, 1996, at 20; Judith M. Rosenberg & David T. Zaring, Managing Medicaid
Waivers: Section 1115 and State Health Care Reform, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 545, 550-51 (1995);
Suzanne Rotwein et al., Medicaid and State Health Care Reform: Process, Programs, and Policy
Options, 16 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 105, 118-20 (1995).
29. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287,303 (1985).
30. See id. (upholding a 14-day annual limit on any beneficiary's hospital inpatient services);
Charleston Mem'l Hosp. v. Conrad, 693 F.2d 324, 329-30 (4th Cir. 1982) (upholding a 12-day annual
limit on any beneficiary's hospital inpatient services).
31. See STARR, supra note 19, at373.
32. This is a difficult question in other areas as well. In crafting remedial legislation addressing
disability discrimination, Congress has required not only nondiscrimination and reasonable
accommodation in access to public accommodations and services for persons with disabilities, 42
U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1994), but also that the accommodations and services not be "different or
separate from that provided to other individuals ... " 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(l)(A)(iii) (1994). And
over forty years ago the Supreme Court held that racially segregated "separate but equal" public
education necessarily violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Brown
v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). But see Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tank, and
United States v. Fordice: Why Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401
[V€OL. 75:1431
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words, is the integration of the poor into the medical mainstream a distinct
goal of Medicaid, or is integration merely one of several strategies available
for improving health care access for the poor?33 If it is the former, essential
community providers are largely unprotected by statute, and may even be a
hindrance to the full achievement of a unitary health care system. If it is the
latter, essential community providers are protected to the extent they can
argue successfully that they advance the health of the poor.
The statutory language contains no reference to mainstreaming or
integrating the care of Medicaid beneficiaries. The most straight-forward
statement of goals in the statute34 is its mandate that participating states
"provide such safeguards as may be necessary to assure that eligibility for
care and services under the plan will be determined, and such care and
services will be provided, in a manner consistent with simplicity of
administration and the best interest of recipients."3" The original legislation
also required that states demonstrate progress toward the goal of providing
"comprehensive care and services to substantially all individuals who meet
the plan's eligibility standards with respect to income and resources,
including services to enable such individuals to attain or retain independence
or self-care." 36 The effective date for achieving this second goal, however,
was first postponed;37 then in 1972 the provision was repealed altogether.
38
Medicaid's very general language provides no definitive indication that
its general goal of enhancing the poor's access to health care carries an
implicit codicil encouraging an end to the dual-track health care system.
Medicaid has evolved over time, and it may be that its focus has shifted.39
(1993).
33. See Charles J. Dougherty, Ethical Values at Stake in Health Care Reform, 268 JAMA 2409,
2409 (1992) (distinguishing between values that are of "intrinsic importance" and those that are
"instrumental to the attainment of what is intrinsically important.")
34. If, indeed, anything about Medicaid could be said to be straight-forward. See How I Learned
to Stop Worrying and Love The Medicaid Statute, in REPRESENTING OLDER PERSONS: AN ADVOCATE
MANUAL 23 (National Senior Citizen Law Center, 1985), excerpted in BARRY IR FURROW Er AL.,
HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 598 (2d Ed. 1991); see also Eleanor D. Kinney,
Rule and Policy Makingfor the Medicaid Program: A Challenge to Federalism, 51 OHIO ST. L.. 855,
856-57 (1990).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(aX19) (1994).
36. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1903(e), 79 Stat. 286, 350
(codified as amended in Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (1994)).
37. See Social Security Amendments of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-56, § 2(a), 83 Stat. 99 (1969). See
Rosenblatt, supra note 21, at 643, 651 n.39.
38. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603 § 230, 86 Stat. 1329, 1410
(1972). See Rosenblatt, supra note 21, at 651 n.39.
39. See Freund & Hurley, supra note 11, at 474 (stating Medicaid "was developed first with a
consuming concern for access and later with cost containment objectives") (footnotes omitted). By
suggesting that the statutory focus has shifted, I mean only that Congress has repeatedly passed
1997] 1437
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With respect to the question of mainstreaming, however, amendments to the
statute are no more illuminating than was the original language. For example,
in an amendment that could be construed as suggesting an emphasis on
mainstreaming, Congress in 1989 required that states "assure that payments
[to providers] are sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and
services are available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and
services are available to the general population in the geographic area.' A
0
This language appears to envision a congruity between the network of health
care providers available to Medicaid beneficiaries and the non-poor, privately
insured population. In the same Act, however, Congress mandated enhanced
Medicaid reimbursement for, and guaranteed beneficiary access to, Federally
Qualified Health Centers and Rural Health Centers, which by design and
practice create a separate system of health care for the poor.' Yet even if
these amendments more clearly expressed a coherent vision of Medicaid's
mission that expression would be of minimal instructive value, as they are
among the provisions that can be waived in a section 1115 Medicaid
managed care program.42
The principle of mainstreaming runs chimerically through discussions of
Medicaid's mission. A major theme of the discussion is that breaking down
the barriers between America's separate health systems is integral to the
program's mission. Rand Rosenblatt, for example, has described the purpose
of the Medicaid statute as directed at mainstreaming:
The ultimate goal of the legislation, stated explicitly in the
"comprehensive care" section [§ 1903(e), repealed in 1972] and
implicitly in other sections, was nothing less than the elimination of
traditional dual track health care for the poor, and the incorporation of
the poor into the "mainstream" or middle-class patterns of hospital and
medical care.43
amendatory statutes, see, e.g., Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239 §
6402(a), 103 Stat. 2106, 2260 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A) (1994)) (adding
mandatory language regarding the availability of providers); see also Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248 § 131(a), 96 Stat. 324, 367 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 13960 (1994)) (modifying cost-sharing provisions), and not that the meaning of the original
statute has been somehow dynamically interpreted by non-legislators, either "beyond" or "against" its
original meaning. Cf WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 49 (1994).
40. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, § 6402(a). See Watson, supra note 6, at 198-99.
41. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, § 6402(c)(2) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396
a(a)(13)(E) (1994)).
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1) (1994). Interview with Michael Fiore, Acting Deputy Director,
Division of Integrated Health Systems, HCFA, June 25, 1997 and July 26, 1997.
43. Rosenblatt, supra note 21, at 649.
[VOL. 75:1431
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Sidney D. Watson similarly describes the purpose of the statute as directed at
eradicating dual-track care, arguing that "Medicaid promised to end this dual
class delivery system by providing poor people with health insurance they
could use to purchase private medical care.""
This mainstreaming vision of Medicaid was embraced by courts and
regulators early in the program's life. In 1975, Judge Jack Weinstein granted
a preliminary injunction against a New York City plan to contract selectively
with clinical laboratories, ruling that such limitations on beneficiary choice
would violate "[t]he acknowledged purpose of the Medicaid program
[which] was to bring the poor into the mainstream of American medical
services.' ' 5 Judge Weinstein cited several provisions of the Medicaid statute
to support his characterization of its purpose:
Congress required that the program be in effect in all parts of the
participating state (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1)); that services be made
available promptly (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8); that services for which
the state pays be comparable for covered groups (42 U.S.C. §
1396a(a)(10)(B)); and that the program be administered in the "best
interests of the recipients" (42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19)). In 1968,
Congress added provisions establishing a system of reviewing use and
quality of care. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)-(31). It permitted Medicaid
recipients to choose health care providers according to their own
preference. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(23). Section 1396(a)(23) is
commonly referred to as the "freedom of choice" provision.
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, later renamed the
Department of Health and Human Services, expressed a similar vision in its
regulatory material:
A basic concept of [Medicaid] is that of equality of medical and
remedial care and services. Its purpose is to erase the differences in the
various categories in regard to care and services. What this means in
44. Watson, supra note 6, at 192.
45. Bay Ridge Diagnostic Lab., Inc. v. Dumpson, 400 F. Supp. 1104, 1106 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)
(citing Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Medicaid and Medicare of the Senate Finance
Committee, 91st Cong. 57 [(1970)]. The Senate hearing record cited by Judge Weinstein included the
following description of Medicaid's purpose: "The whole purpose of the 1965 act was to provide
'mainstream medical care' for all the people of this country. The objective was great, and I think
during the transition, we are bound to have problems." Medicare and Medicaid: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Fin., 91st Cong. 57 (statement of John G. Veneman, Under Secretary, Dept. of
Health, Educ. and Welfare) (1970).
46. Bay Ridge, 400 F. Supp. at 1106.
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actual operation is that AFDC children will be treated the same as all
other recipients.47
Furthermore, the Agency by regulation had required that states set provider
fees at a level "sufficient to enlist enough providers so that services under the
plan are available [to Medicaid beneficiaries] at least to the extent that those
services are available to the general population," 48 long before Congress
amended the statute to ratify that aspect of the Agency's interpretation.49
To the extent that courts, commentators, and regulators suggest that
mainstreaming advances and is consistent with the statutory purposes of
Medicaid, their argument is compelling. The poor have long been subjected
to lesser medical care than the non-poor,50 and bringing them up to the
mainstream of course advances "the best interests of the [Medicaid]
recipients." 5' The goal of "moving to the mainstream" is within the broad
statutory goal of improving services for the poor, and is a rhetorically
effective and easily-grasped articulation of a strategy for achieving such
improvement.
But nothing in the statutory language or legislative history supports
elevating the ideal of mainstreaming from programmatic vehicle to
destination. Few would disagree that providing the poor with care
substantially identical to that of fully insured members of the middle class
would discharge the program's duty to provide "necessary medical care '5 2 in
the "best interest of the recipients. 53 But it would go beyond the evidence of
Congress's intent to suggest that, in constructing Medicaid managed care
programs, state and federal officials are required to embrace mainstreaming
as anything beyond an instrument, a means to an end.
A minor theme of the mainstreaming discussion is contrapuntal to the
major theme, and supports the existence of essential community providers in
the Medicaid managed care system. Many have observed that the poor have
different needs due to historical neglect of their health and general economic
disadvantage.54 The poor therefore require some health services beyond those
47. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE ADMIN., HANDBOOK OF
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, Supp. D, Medical Assistance Program, § D-5143
(Washington, D.C., December 1, 1966), quotedin Rosenblatt, supra note 21, at 648 n.23.
48. 42 C.F.R. § 447.204 (1994).
49. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239 § 6402(a), 103 Stat.
2106,2260 (1989) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30) (1994)).
50. See Sidney D. Watson, Health Care in the Inner City. Asking the Right Question, 71 N.C. L.
REV. 1647, 1649 (1993); STARR, supra note 19, at 151-53; STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 20, at 16.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19) (1994).
52. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19).
54. In 1996 interviews with Medicaid "policy elites" in Connecticut, researchers determined that
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provided to more economically advantaged populations through commercial
health insurance.55 Medicaid beneficiaries' historical (and continuing 56) lack
of access to health care providers, and lack of resources with which to
supplement insurance benefits in the purchase of services, has driven the
program to support the development of specialized community health clinics
through directing grants, mandating access to the clinics for Medicaid
beneficiaries, and requiring enhanced reimbursement levels;57 to develop
highly structured preventive care programs;58 and to create substantial links
with other social service systems. 5 Prior to the emergence of managed care,
Medicaid evolved into a program intended to go beyond "simply giving
eligible recipients a Medicaid 'credit card' and leaving them to find their own
way in a fragmented and inadequate health care system. 60 Rather, the
special needs of the poor were recognized by assisting them in finding
providers willing to serve them,61 and by integrating their health care with
other social support and service systems.
62
About half of the respondents articulated a strong belief that AFDC recipients should be treated
just like anyone else in society, if given the opportunity, they will be able to negotiate the
managed care system like anyone else.... However, many other respondents-particularly those
representing recipients-believe AFDC-Medicaid recipients should be treated differently because
on average they have greater health needs.
Grogan, supra note 27, at 834.
55. See Note, The Impact ofManaged Care on Doctors who Serve Poor and Minority Patients,
108 HARV. L. REV. 1625, 1635 (1995).
56. See Watson, supra note 6.
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(E) (1994) (requiring 100% reasonable cost reimbursement of
federally qualified health centers and rural health clinics).
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r) (1994) (Early and periodic screening, diagnosis, and treatment
services).
59. See Freund & Hurley, supra note 11, at 486-87.
60. Rosenblatt, supra note 21, at 656.
61. Seeid
62. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE ADMIN., supra note
47, at §§ D-1000 & 5140, quoted in STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 20, at 80:
In seeking to put Title XIX into effect, States are expected to approach the provision of such
health services with the aim of making them readily available to all eligible persons. The States
are expected, furthermore, to set standards that will be appropriate to insure that the services will
be of high quality and to adopt methods of administration designed to assure that the services are
furnished in a sympathetic and dignified manner. The emphasis will be focused on medical care as
part of a comprehensive plan for services, not just on payment of the medical bill....
Thie passage of Title XIX marks the beginning of a new era in medical care for low income
families. The potential of this new title can hardly be over-estimated, as its ultimate goal is the
assurance of complete, continuous, family-centered medical care of high quality to persons who
are unable to pay for it themselves. The law aims much higher than the mere paying of medical
bills, and States, in order to achieve its high purpose, will need to assume responsibility for
planning and establishing systems of high quality medical care, comprehensive in scope and wide
in coverage.
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There is an air of anachronism about any attempt to read the effort to
mainstream beneficiaries' medical care as the statutory mission of Medicaid.
Early in its history, Medicaid bore with it the promise of a full, rich,
compassionately administered program that would wipe out America's
legacy of unequal health care for the poor.63 Within a few years of its
creation, however, Congress was chipping away at this promise." By 1971, a
mere six years after Medicaid's enactment, Elliot Richardson, President
Nixon's Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, drove a stake in the
heart of the hope that the passage of Medicaid would lead to a truly
integrated health care system. 5 Since that time, the focus of state Medicaid
policy has been as much on cost containment as on providing adequate health
services to the poor.66 Increasing cost pressures have limited states' ability
and will to maintain reimbursement levels for health care providers that are
sufficient to draw the providers into the program or to add optional services
that would have fulfilled the vision of the program's early years.67
A program whose goals were vague from the beginning,68 Medicaid
evolved away from coherence toward an increasingly complex amalgam of
statutory provisions cobbled together through piecemeal amendment.69 The
lack of internal coherence and clear legislative mandates makes it impossible
to determine, from the statute's text or the legislative record, whether any
See also Silver & Edelstein, supra note 22.
63. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 20, at 51-52.
64. See id. at 143-45.
65. Secretary Richardson testified to Congress as follows:
[S]ince the 1930's the Nation has evolved a basic division of public and private health care roles.
Over the last 35 years government has taken responsibility in health care for the poor, the disabled,
and the aged, while the private sector has provided ever-increasing protection for those in the labor
force through diversity, free choice and competition. We firmly believe that this fundamental
division of responsibilities between the two sectors is desirable, workable, and can serve as a basis
for improvement
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means on the Subject of National Health Insurance
Proposals, 92d Cong., 6 (1971), quoted in Rosenblatt, supra note 21, at 661. The current state of the
"ever-increasing protection for those in the labor force" is a subject for another day. Id. Suffice it to
say, the rosy picture described by Secretary Richardson in 1971 is today decidedly mixed. See Kenneth
E. Thorpe, The Health System in Transition: Care, Cost and Coverage, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L.
339, 351-55 (1997); JOEL S. WEIsSMANN & ARNOLD M. EPSTEIN, FALLING THROUGH THE SAFETY
NET: INSURANCE STATUS AND ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE 18-22 (1994).
66. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 20, at 318-19.
67. See Watson, supra note 6, at 196-98; Rand E. Rosenblatt, Medicaid Primary Care Case
Management, The Doctor-Patient Relationship, and the Politics of Privatization, 36 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 915, 931-32 (1986); Margaret McManus et al., The Adequacy of Physician Reimbursement for
Pediatric Care Under Medicaid, 87 PEDIATRICS 909 (1991).
68. See Kenneth R. Wing, The Impact of Reagan-Era Politics on the Federal Medicaid Program,
33 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1983).
69. See STEVENS & STEVENS, supra note 20, at 316-19; see also Robert L. Schwartz, Medicaid
Reform Through Setting Health Care Priorities, 35 ST. LouiS U. LJ. 837, 837-38 (1991).
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particular approach to providing necessary care to Medicaid beneficiaries is
more consistent with its overall plan than any other approach. The poor
remain dramatically ill-served by our health care system.70 Changes in the
program, to the extent that they are within the remarkably permissive section
1115 waiver limits, are appropriate if they are in the "best interests of the
recipients. 71 The next section demonstrates that state and federal officials
overwhelmingly favor a wholesale shift to managed care as the best means to
advance the interests of Medicaid beneficiaries, sometimes apparently by
mainstreaming beneficiaries' health care, and sometimes by improving their
care, but always by saving money. The statute is clear, however, that neither
managed care nor mainstreaming are ends in themselves, but can be parts of
strategies to eliminate the second-class level of health care experienced by
the poor.
72
II. MEDICAID MANAGED CARE AND PROTECTION OF THE SAFETY NET
Medicaid managed care represents the outer reaches of states'
experimentation with mechanisms to attain their goals of providing
appropriate care to beneficiaries while reining in the exploding costs of the
program. Medicaid, like the other social welfare programs of the Social
Security Act, is a joint federal-state venture, with the two levels of
government sharing both cost and governance. Although states have
substantial flexibility in the design of their Medicaid programs, federal
requirements cabin that discretion.73 The limitation in the states' ability to
shape their programs has been blamed for their experiencing increasing
Medicaid expenditures in the last decade or more.74 However, since 1962-
three years before Medicaid was enacted-the federal government has
permitted states to employ section 1115 waivers to undertake
"demonstration" projects in welfare programs (including, since 1965,
Medicaid). The waivers excuse compliance with a wide range of otherwise-
70. There are limits to the pessimism regarding the Medicaid program. Although the program has
certainly not created a unitary, comprehensive system of health care, there is no doubt that the poor
have received better access to care, particularly primary care, thanks to the Medicaid program. See
Robert F. St. Peter et al., Access to Care for Poor Children: Separate and Unequal?, 267 JAMA 2760
(1992); Paul W. Newacheck & Neal Halfon, Preventive Care Use by School-Aged Children:
Differences by Socioeconomic Status, 82 PEDIATRICS 462 (1988).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(19) (1994).
72. See Freund & Hurley, supra note 11, at 494 ('M]anaged care does not address Medicaid's
severe financial problems, which are likely to persist so long as financing of programs and services for
the poor are segregated from financing for other beneficiary groups.")
73. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1994); 45 C.F.R1 § 302.0 -302.85 (1995).
74. See PHYSCIAN PAYMENT REviEW COMMISSION, ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 422-24 (1997)
[hereinafter 1997 PPRC REPORT]; Rosenberg & Zaring, supra note 28, at 546-47.
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applicable federal program requirements.75 Since 1981, states have been
permitted to employ section 1915 waivers to undertake longer term but more
targeted projects varying from the generally applicable federal
requirements.76 With the passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, the
limited goal of moving Medicaid beneficiaries to managed care may be
achieved without a waiver.77
The use of waivers for Medicaid managed care suffered a false start in
California in the early 1970s, in a program rife with fraud, poor service, and
mismanagement at the state and provider levels.78 Beginning in 1981, states
began to pursue limited waivers to pursue managed care projects "to control
the growth and improve the predictability of expenditure increases."79 Since
1993, there has been an explosion of growth in Medicaid managed care, as
the federal review process to which states are subject has become simpler,
even inviting.80 The "demonstration" aspect of section 1115- waivers has
effectively fallen away, as similar programs are approved in several states,
for longer periods of time, and with relaxed standards of budget neutrality.81
Although states have created many types of managed care programs,
utilizing a wide variety of managed care organizations, the trend has been
toward broad programs mandating the enrollment of large segments of the
Medicaid population in managed care, and toward contracting with health
maintenance organizations ("HMOs") to provide a comprehensive array of
services in return for a capitated payment. 82 The rise of managed care waiver
programs, and particularly of section 1115 waiver programs, reflects the
growing adoption by state and federal officials of new health management
75. See Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, tit. I, § 1115 76 Stat. 172, 192
(codified as amended at42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1994)).
76. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 2161, 95 Stat. 357
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b),(c) (1994)).
77. See ROWLAND ETAL., supra note 27, at 7; Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33,
111 Stat. 251 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a) note (1997).
78. See Iglehart, supra note 27, at 1730; ROWLAND Er AL., supra note 27, at 6; Freund & Hurley,
supra note 11, at 476; David F. Chavkin & Anne Treseder, California's Prepaid Health Plan
Program: Can the Patient Be Saved?, 28 HASTINGS L.L 685, 686 (1977).
79. Freund & Hurley, supra note 11, at 474.
80. See 59 Fed. Reg. 49,249 (1994) (discussing relaxed criteria for managed care waivers); see
also ROWLAND ET AL., supra note 27, at 8-9; Iglehart, supra note 27, at 1728; Ferber, supra note 5, at
99-100.
81. See Rosenberg & Zaring, supra note 28, at 549-51. But see Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057,
1076 (9th Cir. 1994) (remanding § 1115 waiver of cash-benefit welfare program requirements for
more study on the scope of waiver and its effect on recipients).
82. See 1997 PPRC REPORT, supra note 74, at 425-31; UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, MEDICAID: SPENDING PREssURES DRIVE STATES TOWARD PROGRAM REINVENTION
GAO/HEHS=95-122 (April 1995) [hereinafter U.S. GAO, MEDICAID].
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techniques for restraining and regularizing health care costs.
8 3
The increase in the number of Medicaid beneficiaries shifted to managed
care in recent years has been spectacular. In the five years from 1991 to
1996, the number of Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in managed care shot
from 2,696,397 (9.53% of the Medicaid population) to 13,330,119 (40.10%
of the Medicaid population).8 4 This shift to managed care has "alarmed"
historical providers of care to Medicaid beneficiaries, who "find their
positions threatened as managed care plans compete to enroll these patients
and channel them to their own provider networks. 85
Policymakers reacting to this alarm are faced with a difficult problem. At
its heart, Medicaid managed care is the "privatization' of the network
formation and provider reimbursement aspects of the Medicaid program.
States contract with managed care organizations to provide comprehensive
care to a segment of the Medicaid population, often paying them a flat,
capitated fee for that care. In return, the managed care organizations take
responsibility for matching the population with an accessible, appropriate
array of health care providers. 6 Privatization is touted for encouraging
efficiencies through competition, and for reducing regulatory restraints in
83. See Grogan, supra note 27, at 818-19; Rotwein et al., supra note 28, at 120.
84. See Health Care Financing Administration, supra note 5; see also 1997 PPRC REPORT, supra
note 74, at 424; 1 SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., CENTER FOR HEALTH POLICY RESEARCH, GEO. WASH.
U. MEDICAL CENTER, NEGOTIATING THE NEW HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: A NATIONWIDE STUDY OF
MEDICAID MANAGED CARE CONTRACTS, iv-x (1997); Holahan et al., supra note 5, at 208.
85. Iglehart, supra note 27, at 1727; see also Debra J. Lipson, Medicaid Managed Care and
Community Providers: New Partnerships, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1997, at 91, 93; Schauffler &
Wolin, supra note 9, at 461.
Some traditional providers of Medicaid care have banded together to form managed care
organizations of their own, and in this guise continue to control their own destinies in the evolving
Medicaid system. See Michelle M. Casey et al., Rural Health Network Development: Public Policy
Issues and State Initiatives, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 23 (1997); Sparer, supra note 11, at 433;
Heuer, supra note 7. Commercial HMOs increasingly dominate the Medicaid managed care
marketplace, however, as states seek to move quickly to integrate Medicaid populations into
mainstream health care. See Diane Rowland & Kristina Hanson, Medicaid: Moving to Managed Care,
HEALTH AFF., Fall 1996, at 150, 150-51; Marsha Gold et al., Medicaid Managed Care: Lessons From
Five States, HEALTH AFF., Fall 1996, at 153, 159-162. For-profit ownership is increasingly dominant
among managed care organizations generally, and for-profit plans (particularly large, multi-state plans)
are growing more rapidly than non-profits. See Janet M. Corrigan et al., Trends Toward a National
Health Care Marketplace, 34 INQUIRY 11 (1997). In contrast, the number of hospital beds in non-
profit ownership has remained at about 70%, with 20% in public hospitals and only about 10% in for-
profit ownership. See Gary Claxton et al., Public Policy Issues in Nonprofit Conversions: An
Overview, HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 9 (1997). The effect of shifts in ownership of health care
firms from nonprofit to for-profit is a separate but closely-related controversy. See id.; see also Mark
Schlesinger et al., Charity and Community: The Role of Nonprofit Ownership in a Managed Health
Care System, 21 J. HEALTH POL POL'Y & L. 697 (1996).
86. See DIANE ROWLAND E" AL., supra note 27, at 10-11.
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management and employment matters.87 In cost terms, privatization efforts
by state and local governments have been broadly successful.88 States'
movement to managed care as a privatization of management and financing
services in Medicaid programs is, then, an extension of a trend in the
relationship among government, nonprofits, and markets. Thus, an
inclination to permit the contracting managed care organizations to manage
their own networks-their subcontractors-is to be expected.
For state and federal officials, Medicaid managed care shifts a nettlesome
administrative burden to private contractors and offers some moderation of
Medicaid's financial pressures.8 9 But to carry through on the "prihatization'
of the network formation aspects of this arrangement, state and federal
officials would at least risk the continuing viability of traditional Medicaid
providers, which rely on Medicaid reimbursement and would have no
guarantee of survival in the private competitive world of network formation
under a purely privatized system. That is, there is no guarantee that
commercial managed care organizations will select traditional Medicaid
providers for membership in their provider networks. Indeed, there is reason
to believe that they will be inclined not to include them. Managed care
organizations place great stock in their ability to select, limit, and control
their network of providers.90 In evaluating providers for network
membership, managed care organizations value efficiency, practice methods
that reduce utilization of high-cost modalities of care, well-developed quality
measurement systems, and integration with broad delivery systems.9' Many
traditional Medicaid providers are perceived to score poorly on these
criteria.92 In addition, these providers often care for patients who are
vulnerable in terms of health needs, socioeconomic status, and cultural and
language barriers.93 Managed care organizations "may assume that all
87. See DONALD F. KETrL, SHARING POWER: PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AND PRIVATE MARKETS
160-63 (1993); Marc Benedick, Jr., Privatizing the Delivery of Social Welfare Services: An Idea to be
Taken Seriously, in PRIVATIZATION AND THE WELFARE STATE 97, 107 (Shelia B. Kamerman & Alfred
J. Kahn eds., 1989).
88. See KETTL, supra note 87, at 160; Benedick, supra note 87, at 107.
89. Some controversy exists regarding the extent to which Medicaid managed care provides
genuine financial benefits to the states. See Note, The Impact of Medicaid Managed Care on the
Uninsured, 110 HARV. L. REV. 751, 755-57 (1997); William Alvarado Rivera, A Future for Medicaid
Managed Care: The Lessons of California's San Mateo County, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 105, 116
(1996); ROWLAND ET AL., supra note 27, at 19-20. The resolution of that question is beyond the scope
of this article.
90. See infra text accompanying note 139.
91. See Raymond J. Baxter & Robert E. Mechanic, The Status of Local Health Safety Nets,
HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1997, at7, 19.
92. See id.
93. See Lipson, supra note 85, at 94.
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community-based providers serve high-risk, sicker populations, which would
increase the risk of adverse selection for [managed care organizations] that
have community-based providers in their provider network."94 The exclusion
of community-based providers from managed-care networks in states with
comprehensive Medicaid managed care programs can interfere with these
community-based providers' relationship with Medicaid patients, and the
revenue stream on which these providers rely to provide care to Medicaid
and uninsured patients.
95
For a variety of reasons which are evaluated in Part m below, officials
have equivocated when faced with this dilemma, and have attempted to
accommodate both the impulse to move to market systems and the desire to
maintain essential community providers. They have done so by formally or
informally creating essential community provider provisions that limit
market forces, thereby allowing some historical providers of health care to
the poor preferred entry into essentially private managed care networks.96
Essential community provider provisions gained prominence as part of
President Clinton's proposed Health Security Act.97 The proposal would
have required all "health plans" (the name given participating insurers and
managed care entities under the proposal 98) either to include essential
community providers in their networks on terms "at least as favorable as
those that are applicable to other providers participating in the health plan,"
or to contract with them for compensation pursuant to a regulatorily-created
fee schedule.99 The term "essential community provider" was broadly
94. l
95. See id at 93.
96. The thrust of the protections offered by states to essential community providers is limited to
assured or assisted entry into managed care networks. The essential community providers would then
be subject to intra-plan competition and the possibility that they would lose market share to other
network providers that may be new to Medicaid. Thus, the essential community provider provisions
can be seen as a necessary but not sufficient measure in these providers' efforts to survive in a
competitive Medicaid marketplace. To survive, essential community providers must not only
participate in Medicaid managed care networks, but do so successfully. See Gold et al., supra note 85,
at 163; Schauffler & Wolin, supra note 9, at 471-73.
97. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1993). A description of the proposed Health Security Act is beyond
the scope of this paper. For a concise description of the intended functioning of the plan, see Walter A.
Zelman, The Rationale Behind the Clinton Health Care Reform Plan, HEALTH AFF., Spring (I) 1994,
at 9; THE WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL, THE CLINTON BLUEPRINT: THE PRESIDENT'S
HEALTH SECURITY PLAN (1993). For perspectives on the reform effort's resounding defeat, see, e.g.,
THEDA SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG: CLINTON'S HEALTH SECURITY EFFORT AND THE TURN AGAINST
GOVERNMENT IN U.S. POLITICS (1996); Hugh Heclo, The Clinton Health Plan: Historical Perspective,
HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 86.
98. SeeLR. 3600, 103d Cong. § 1400(1993).
99. Seeid. § 1431.
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defined in the Act.'00 Some categories of providers were to be automatically
designated as essential community providers, including statutorily defined
federally qualified health centers, rural health centers, family planning
clinics, and service units of the Indian Health Service.' 0' In addition,
"qualified community practice networks"--consortia created to provide
services to a "medically underserved population"l---were to be so
designated. 0 3 Finally, public hospitals and nonprofit community hospitals,
health professionals, and other public and nonprofit organizations located in
"health professional shortage areas" and serving a "medically underserved
population" were to be permitted to apply to the Secretary of Health and
Human Services for designation as essential community providers. 1°4 This
essential community provider provision would have accommodated the
conflict between market freedom and protection of favored providers by
requiring that essential community providers participate in health plan
networks, but not otherwise requiring health plans to accord them any
significant special status.1
05
Current federal Medicaid law requires that states provide beneficiaries
access to services offered by some community health centers, (although the
enhanced payments diminish over time), 06 and also enhanced payments to
"disproportionate share hospitals."' 0 7 Even prior to the Balanced Budget Act,
Medicaid managed care waivers pernitted states, with federal approval, to
100. See id. §§ 1581-1584.
101. See id. § 1582(a).
102. A "qualified community practice network" was to be a "public or nonprofit" entity whose
mission was to provide services "in one or more health professional shortage areas or to provide such
items and services to a significant number of individuals who are members of a medically underserved
population." Id. § 3421(b), (c). The entity had to be a consortium of providers listed in the statute,
including public health agencies and community health clinics. See id. § 3421(c), (d).
103. See id. § 1582(a)(11).
104. See id. § 1583. The definition of "essential community provider" was to be part of a study of
essential community providers undertaken by the Secretary of Health and Human Services in
preparation of a report to Congress on possible amendments to the Act's provisions in this regard. See
id. § 1431(b), (c).
105. The wild card in this regard would have been the fee schedules created for compensation of
essential community providers that did not elect to enter into a provider agreement. If the fees in the
schedule were set sufficiently low, this "opt-out" provision would have provided little protection,
while high fees would have provided substantial advantage for essential community providers over
other providers. As the Act was never adopted, we will of course never know how the opt-out
provision would have functioned.
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(E) (1994) (providing for reimbursement of rural health centers
and federally-qualified health centers); id. § 1396d(a)(xi)(2) (specifying rural health centers and
federally-qualified health centers services for which state Medicaid plans must pay); 42 C.F.1L
§ 440.20(b) (1994) (listing rural health center and federally-qualified health center services that must
be accessible to Medicaid beneficiaries); Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4712, 111 Stat. 508-09 (codified as
amended 42 U.S.C. § 1396a note (1994)) (phasing out enhanced payments).
107. See infra notes 158-59 and accompanying text.
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gain partial or total relief from those provisions.10 8 No federal law, then,
mandates protection of essential community providers, although as is
discussed below, 1°9 federal regulators retain and use the discretionary
authority to condition the grant of section 1115 waivers on favorable
treatment of essential community providers.
A few states have enacted statutes granting varying degrees of special
status to some essential community providers. Louisiana, for example,
mandates that benefit plans providing services pursuant to a Medicaid
managed care waiver' include essential community providers, including
community health centers and "[p]hysicians who have historically served
Medicaid and indigent patients" in their networks.' South Carolina
designates a much more limited class of providers-Federally Qualified
Health Centers and Rural Health Clinics-as essential community providers,
and mandates their inclusion in "any formulation of the state health care
system.""12 Maine" 3 and Minnesota" 4 go further, requiring in the former
case that all HMOs agree to include essential community providers in their
networks, and in the latter that most health plans include them." 5 Minnesota
has the most detailed definition of essential community provider, allowing an
108. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1315(a), 1396n(b) (1994); see Memorandum from Acting Director,
Medicaid Managed Care Team to All Associate Regional Administrators, Division of Medicaid (Feb.
8, 1996) (on file with the author); interview with Michael Fiore, supra note 42; interview with
Matthew Barry, Office of Managed Care, Health Care Financing Administration (Mar. 20, 1997). See
generally Debra J. Lipson & Naomi Naierman, Effects of Health System Changes on Safety-Net
Providers, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1996, at 33; Suzanne Rotwein et al., supra note 28.
109. See infra text accompanying note 117.
110. Louisiana has applied for, but has not yet received approval for, a § 1115 waiver. See Health
Care Financing Administration, Louisiana Statewide Health Reform Demonstration Fact Sheet (last
modified May 13, 1997) <http://www.hefa.gov/medicaid/lafacthtml>.
111. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2241-2242 (West 1997). "Essential community providers are
defined as:
health care providers who have historically served medically needy or indigent patients, including
each of the following:
(1) Federally qualified health centers.
(2) Rural health clinics.
(3) Hospitals owned and operated by the state and the Louisiana Health Care Authority.
(4) Community health centers.
(5) Small rural and service district hospitals.
(6) Physicians who have historically served Medicaid and indigent patients.
(7) Children's hospital as defined by 42 CFR 412.23(d).
Id. § 2241(A).
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-6-910 (Law Co-op. 1996).
113. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4204(2)(M) (West 1996).
114. MINN. STAT. § 62Q.19 (1997).
115. Ironically, Minnesota excludes from this requirement health plans "with fewer than 50,000
enrollees, all of whose enrollees are covered under medical assistance, general assistance medical care,
or MinnesotaCare." Id. § 62Q.19, subd. 2a.
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entity to be designated as such if it meets the following criteria:
(1) a demonstrated ability to integrate applicable supportive and
stabilizing services with medical care for uninsured persons and high-
risk and special needs populations..., underserved, and other special
needs populations; and
(2) a commitment to serve low-income and underserved populations
by meeting the following requirements:
(i) has nonprofit status [under state law];
(ii) has tax exempt status in accordance with Internal Revenue
Service Code, section 501(c)(3) [endnote omitted];
(iii) charges for services on a sliding fee schedule based on current
poverty income guidelines; and
(iv) does not restrict access or services because of a client's
financial limitation; or
(3) status as a local government unit..., an Indian tribal government,
an Indian health service unit, or community health board .... 116
Most states, however, have made no such provisions by law or regulation.
The absence of state or federal law requiring essential community
provider provisions in Medicaid managed care or other programs does not,
however, end the analysis. Using their substantial discretion to shape and
review section 1115 waiver applications and contracts between states and
participating managed care organizations, regulatory officials have created a
patchwork of essential community provider provisions through an informal
negotiation process that occurs at two levels. First, state officials negotiate
with the HCFA during the process of applying for and obtaining a
section 1115 waiver. The Social Security Act grants the Secretary of Health
and Human Services broad latitude in determining whether to grant a
waiver.! 17 Outer limits provide some restraint on the Secretary's ability to
override the general Medicaid requirements in granting a section 1115
waiver,' 8 but within these broad limits, the secretary has a great deal of room
116. Id.§62Q.19,subd. 1.
117. The section of the Act authorizing § 1115 waivers permits the Secretary to approve a state's
application "to the extent and for the period he finds necessary to enable such State or States to carry
out such project... " 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1) (1994). Section 1915(b) waivers may be approved "to
the extent [the Secretary] finds it to be cost-effective and efficient and not inconsistent with the
purposes of this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b) (1994).
118. See Beno v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 1057, 1068-69 (9th Cir. 1994):
The legislative scheme, with its mandatory language and detailed requirements, evidences a clear
Congressional intent to take certain decisions away from state officials. In granting a § 1315(a)
waiver, the Secretary allows the state to deviate from the minimum requirements which Congress
has determined are necessary prerequisites to federal funding.
[VCOL. 75:1431
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within which to exercise discretion, and therefore to prevail upon state
applicants to modify their proposals to more nearly comport with her
judgment on public policy matters.1 9 Current Secretary Donna Shalala has
served public notice that she intends to exercise that discretionary authority
in reviewing section 1115 Medicaid managed care waivers.1 20 She has also
indicated the Department of Health and Human Services will "[w]ork with
States to develop research and demonstrations in areas consistent with the
Department's policy goals," but it "may disapprove or limit proposals on
policy grounds.'
121
In other words, states must be prepared for a fair amount of give and take
in the waiver approval process. And they must expect that any section 1115
waiver will be granted subject to very specific "terms and conditions" of the
waiver, against which states will be measured during evaluative reviews. 22
The modifications and conditions "suggested" by federal officials during the
review process can be specific and detailed. When approving waivers of
reimbursement or access guarantees related to Federally Qualified Health
Centers or Rural Health Clinics,' 2 federal reviewers have routinely imposed
specific terms and conditions calculated to ensure beneficiary access to
community health centers' services, and to demonstrate how culturally
sensitive services will be provided in the waivered system. 124
In a broader sense, this negotiation process permits federal officials to
"encourage" states to include measures protecting essential community
providers. Following a state's initial application for a waiver, it is required to
submit an "operational protocol," a massive document that details the
projected implementation of the waiver. 25 In preparing a "readiness
assessment" of the state program, the federal officials then undertake an
investigation, including in-state visits. During this investigation they seek to
While § 1315(a) obviously represents a congressional judgment that, in certain
circumstances, such an override is appropriate, we doubt that Congress would enact such
comprehensive regulations, frame them in mandatory language, require the Secretary to enforce
them, and then enact a statute allowing states to evade these requirements with little or no federal
agency review.
Id. (citations ommitted). The court concluded that the Secretary is required to consider objections and
comments on proposed waivers in light of the contextual statutory purpose. See id. at 1076.
119. See Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1103 (2d Cir. 1973).
120. See 59 Fed. Reg. 49,249 (1994) (public notice describing Secretary's review process).
121. Id.
122. See icl at49,251.
123. Approximately two-thirds of the 14 or 15 § 1115 Medicaid managed care waivers that have
been granted have included waivers of these community health clinics' 100% cost reimbursement or
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identify the current and historical providers of Medicaid services and ask for
assurances that no falloff of appropriate services will result from a grant of
the waiver application. 26 In the course of seeking such assurances, federal
officials "strongly encourage" the continuing participation of essential
community providers.1
27
But this attempt to maintain the viability of the historic providers of
Medicaid services is tempered by a desire to be flexible, and to allow states
to improve access to services by bringing expanded networks of commercial
health care providers into the Medicaid system.128 The federal reviewers of
state waiver applications therefore attempt to strike a delicate balance by
allowing states to employ the tools of competitive commercial managed care
organizations and commercial health care providers in order to expand access
and constrain costs, while preserving the historic infrastructure of traditional
Medicaid providers. 129 The process is by its nature ad hoc, and the
effectiveness of the attempts to balance disparate social goals can only be
judged over time.
Not by mere coincidence, the second level of informal negotiation in the
section 1115 waiver process closely tracks the first. In the first, federal
officials negotiate with state officials over terms and conditions that will,
among other things, provide some protection to essential community
providers. In the second level, states negotiate with managed care
organizations over the terms of the contract that will define the latters'
obligations, in their construction of provider networks, to provide, among
other things, for some special accommodation of essential community
providers. No doubt spurred in part by the urgings of federal officials, state
officials are
actively engaged in the complex task of developing [with managed
care plans] service agreements which seek to address complex
questions regarding: how covered care and services should be
delivered; how accessible health care should be; the settings in which
care should be furnished; the types of health care professionals and
institutions that should be part of managed care networks; and how







130. 1 ROSENBAUM ETAL., supra note 84, at 16-17.
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Preliminary examinations of the contracts between states and the
managed care plans reveal varying forms of essential community provider
provisions, most of them concentrating on Federally Qualified Health
Centers and Rural Health Clinics, which enjoy some limited protection under
Medicaid law.131 Some state contracts require managed care organizations to
contract with Federally Qualified Health Centers and Rural Health Centers,
and to pay them on terms no less favorable than the rate enjoyed by other
providers.132 Others require that these community health clinics, if they are
members of the network, receive payment at a rate no less favorable than that
paid other contractors. 133 Some states' contracts require that managed care
organizations reimburse community health clinics at 100% full cost unless
the community health clinic agrees to an alternative arrangement, for
example, capitation. 134 Still other states provide that community health
clinics that agree to participate in Medicaid managed care networks must be
paid "fair" reimbursement by the managed care organization, that is, no less
than that paid to other participating providers, and the state Medicaid agency
will make up the difference to bring the community health clinic's total
reimbursement up to 100% full cost.
35
States, then, have employed an array of provisions, mostly through
131. See supra text accompanying notes 110-16; see also I ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 84, at
33 (suggesting that if access to these community health clinics is not provided through managed care
contracts, then state Medicaid agencies "must pay for [it] as a residual service."). Notwithstanding the
special statutory position of these community health clinics, the Health Care Financing Agency
regards itself as empowered by 42 U.S.C. § 1315 to waive broad aspects of both the cost and access
protections of the clinics. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1994). As of this writing, the Agency has approved
only waivers that incorporate a purpose of involving essential community providers in the waivered
Medicaid program. Personal Interview with Michael Fiore, supra note 42. Continuation of this
solicitous attitude is of central importance to essential community providers. If they were to be
excluded from the managed care provider networks, they would be largely separated from their
historic patient base even if beneficiaries retain a formal entitlement of access to their services.
132. See, e.g., Delaware RFP at 11.44, reprinted in 2 ROSENBAUM E" AL., supra note 84, at 7-81,
7-82; Montana Contract at 1-17, reprinted in 2 ROSENBAUM E" AL., supra note 84, at 7-97, 7-98;
Minnesota Contract at 17-18, reprinted in 2 ROSENBAUM Er AL., supra note 84, at 7-92, 7-93.
133. See, e.g., Rhode Island Contract at 26, reprinted in 2 ROSENBAUM Er AL., supra note 84, at
7-108 to 7-111; Vermont RFP at 2-31, reprinted in 2 ROSENBAUM Er AL., supra note 84, at 7-115 to 7-
117.
134. See, e.g., Colorado Contract at 29, reprinted in 2 ROSENBAUM Er AL., supra note 84, at 7-81;
District of Columbia Contract at 12, reprinted in 2 ROSENBAUM Er AL., supra note 84, at 7-82; Illinois
Contract at 28, reprinted in 2 ROSENBAUM Er AL., supra note 84, at 7-87; Kansas Contract at 64,
reprinted in 2 ROSENBAUM Er AL., supra note 84, at 7-88, 7-89; Maryland Contract at 32-33, reprinted
in 2 ROSENBAUM Er AL., supra note 84, at 7-89, 7-90; Pennsylvania RFP at 90, reprinted in 2
ROSENBAUM Er AL., supra note 84, at 7-107, 7-108.
135. See, e.g., Michigan Contract at 8, reprinted in 2 ROSENBAUM Er AL., supra note 84, at 7-91,
7-92; New Jersey Contract at 22, reprinted in 2 ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 84, at 7-100, 7-101;
New York RFP at 66-67, reprinted in 2 ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 84, at 7-101, 7-102; Texas
Contract at 15, reprinted in 2 ROSENBAUMETAL.,SUpra note 84, at 7-112, 7-113.
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contracts with managed care providers, to provide some protections to some
traditional Medicaid providers.136 There is no indication yet that such
measures damage states' ability to move to a competitive Medicaid managed
care system. But the essential community provider provisions vary, and the
uncertainty plagues historical Medicaid providers as they anticipate
increasing Medicaid managed care activity.
III. ESSENTIAL COMMUNITY PROVIDER PROVISIONS: JUSTIFIED
INTERFERENCE IN MARKETS
As the previous section describes, some states have provided a measure of
preferred status to essential community providers in the structure of Medicaid
managed care networks by statute, regulation or, most commonly, by the
terms of the states' contracts with Medicaid-participating HMOs.' The
nature of this preferred status varies, and is sometimes ill-defined. What is
clear is that the states have split regarding whether essential community
providers should receive special status in Medicaid managed care.
After considering arguments for both viewpoints, this section describes
reasons supporting granting essential community providers some special
protections. Granting essential community providers special status may seem
contrary to the basic principles driving Medicaid managed care. States pursue
Medicaid managed care in order to privatize Medicaid, to become purchasers
of health insurance for the poor rather than purchasers of (or providers of)
health care for the poor. States are increasingly pursuing this privatization
because they believe-on the basis of some evidence-that managers of
commercial HMOs have extracted substantial savings in the non-
governmental health insurance arena, at least in the short term. 38 Further,
136. The provisions described in the text are by no means exhaustive. In a recent article, Debra 3.
Lipson describes six categories of state action regarding participation of traditional Medicaid providers
in managed-care groups. These six actions are: (1) California created a program in which plans
"developed by county governments and traditional [Medicaid] providers" were one of two plans from
which beneficiaries in densely populated counties could choose; (2) some states required plans to
contract with traditional Medicaid providers as a condition of program participation; (3) some states in
a bidding process favored plans including traditional Medicaid providers; (4) some states assigned
more beneficiaries to plans including traditional Medicaid providers; (5) some states set "performance
standards" that would be met more easily with the participation of traditional Medicaid providers; and
(6) some states directed "transitional payments" or "enhanced reimbursement" to traditional Medicaid
providers. See Lipson, supra note 85, at 102-04.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 96-136.
138. See 1 ROSENBAUM ETAL., supra note 84, at 8-9.
In the long term, it may be possible [for managed care organizations] to realize savings through
greater use of certain types of care, such as preventive services. In the short term, however,
managed care organizations realize immediate savings (and therefore, profitability) by curbing
utilization of health care or substituting less costly forms of treatment for more costly health
[VOL. 75:1431
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss4/5
HEALTH CARE COMMUNITY PROVIDERS
these savings are often attributed not to HMOs' fabled ability to manage their
members' care, thereby keeping them well, but to HMOs' ability to manage,
through selection, close oversight, and creative incentives, their network of
providers. 139 This faith in the power of network management runs deep in
health administration circles, and has become an article of faith in
government at all levels.
140
States' strong interest in cost containment is a substantial argument
against granting essential community providers preferred entry into Medicaid
managed care networks. Any special status granted essential community
providers would interfere with HMOs' ability to manage their networks of
providers independently. If independent management of provider networks is
a substantial factor in the success of HMOs in restraining the rate of health
care inflation, interference with that management threatens to undermine the
effectiveness of the waiver programs. States arguably would be attempting to
have it both ways: to gain the financial benefit of turning over the
management of Medicaid to commercial actors, while retaining in the public
sector some of the management prerogatives allegedly central to the success
of managed care.
To counter this argument against inclusion, the reasons supporting
services ... 
Because of its basic structure, Medicaid may be more amenable to short-term, rather than
long-term, savings.
Id; see also John F. Sheils & Randall A. Haught, Managed Care Savings for Employers and
Households: 1990 through 2000, at 16, 37 (visited Feb. 3, 1998) <http://ww.aahp.org/menus/
index.cfm> (estimating private health insurance savings attributable to managed care in 1996 at
between $23.8 and $37.4 billion, and projecting private health insurance savings attributable to
managed care from 1997 through 2000 at between $125 and $202 billion).
139. See Karen A. Jordan, Managed Competition and Limited Choice of Providers: Countering
Negative Perceptions Through a Responsibility to Select Quality Network Physicians, 27 AIZ. ST.
L.J. 875, 915-16 (1995); Christine C. Dodd, Comment, The Exclusion ofNon-Physician Health Care
Providers from Integrated Delivery Systems: Group Boycott or Legitimate Business Practice?, 64 U.
CIN. L. REv. 983, 989 (1996); Gary A. Francesconi, ERISA Preemption of "Any Willing Provider"
Laws-An Essential Step Toward National Health Care Reform, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 227, 231 (1995).
140. See Iglehart, supra note 27, at 1727:
The sharp divide between Democrats and Republicans on most major health policy issues largely
disappears when the subject toms to how federal and state governments should provide medical
care to the vulnerable populations that are eligible for Medicaid coverage. Figures as politically
disparate as President Bill Clinton and House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.), as well as most of
the nation's governors, have concluded that states should have the flexibility to enroll many of
Medicaid's more than 32 million beneficiaries in managed care plans. They believe such plans
hold the greatest potential for stemming the rapid growth of Medicaid expenditures and for
expanding coverage to uninsured people with low incomes.
d; see also Managed Care May Save Money, But Hard To Say How Much, 1995 CONG. Q. 2905
(September 23, 1995); Freund & Hurley, supra note 11, at 474; Rosenberg & Zaring, supra note 28, at
549-5 1; Rivera, supra note 89, at 106.
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essential community provider provisions must go beyond a sense of gratitude
to essential community providers for their mission-driven service to the poor
when profit-driven institutions were uninterested and instead hew closely to
the statutory purposes of Medicaid. Further, they may not be premised on an
ideological dislike of for-profit institutions if, as I argue above, corporate
structure is of only instrumental, not essential, importance to the goal of
providing care for the medically indigent.1 41 It is also not sensible to force the
inclusion of traditional Medicaid providers on the basis of their alleged lower
historical costs, although there is some evidence that nonprofit providers
have lower costs than for-profits.1 42 The movement to Medicaid managed
care is premised on the competitive abilities of commercial managed care
organizations. If these competitive abilities have any value, they must
encompass price discrimination. It would therefore seem anomalous to
embrace privatization of network formation, only to retain in the states the
power to determine which network providers are least costly. A slightly more
appealing, but similarly unpersuasive argument is that society has invested in
public and nonprofit facilities, and that investment should not be "wasted."'
143
141. See supra text accompanying notes 29-38. The instrumental nature of business activities in
the effort to provide care to the needy was captured recently by Sister Jean deBlois, vice president for
Mission Services of the Catholic Health Association:
[Raising the red flag of the supposed dichotomy between business and ministry blinds people to
the reality that business, because it is a human endeavor, can be a graced activity. 'Doing
business" should not be seen as the nemesis of "doing ministry." Rather, business should be
understood as an instrumental value that enables us to do what ministry requires. This means, of
course, that the manner in which we conduct the business of health ministry must be informed and
driven by the values and commitments that flow from the MISSION [sic] imperative.
Sr. Jean deBlois, The MISSION Imperative: Our Foundation and Market Advantage, HEALTH
PROGRESS, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 24, 27.
An argument for an absolute ban on for-profit institutions in Medicaid managed care now seems
somewhat quaint. It would depend on assumptions that informed consumer choice combined with
appropriate legal protections is never able to discriminate among profit-seeking and nonprofit
providers, that the participation of for-profit institutions in the market has no beneficial effect on the
responsive actions ofnonprofits, and that there is sufficient capacity in the nonprofit sector to meet the
demand for services. See Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 27,40-41 (Walter W. Powell, ed., 1987).
142. See William J. Lynk, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and the Exercise of Market Power, 38 J.L.
& ECON. 437, 439-40 (1995); Larkin, supra note 9; Schauffler & Wolin, supra note 9; see also Steffie
Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, Costs of Care and Administration at For-Profit and Other
Hospitals in the United States, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 769, 772 (1997); Stuart H. Altman & David
Shactman, Should We Worry about Hospitals'High Administrative Costs?, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED.
798(1997).
143. Reduced (perhaps unfairly) to its essence, this argument is that the very existence of
expensive public and nonprofit facilities is sufficient justification for their current protection. At this
level, the argument is a variant of the "because it's there" explanation, attributed to George Leigh
Mallory (mountaineer), see OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 443 (4th ed. 1992), or the "because
that's where the money is" explanation, attributed to Willie Sutton (bank robber).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss4/5
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The mere fact of past investment in infrastructure, however, cannot support
future investment, unless future investment can be justified on its own
merits.
144
An argument that prior public or nonprofit investment should be protected
from competitive pressure because the institutions relied on regulators'
explicit or implicit promises of continuing reimbursement streams is similar
to that made by for-profit electric utility firms in the face of deregulation.
There, investors in for-profit firms argue that they have "stranded costs,
which can be defined as those costs that the utilities currently are permitted to
recover through their rates but whose recovery may be impeded or prevented
by the advent of competition in the industry."'145 These costs were incurred
by the utilities during years of heavy regulation, often to advance public
purposes (such as encouraging alternative fuel sources, temporarily
ameliorating rate pressure, or allowing access to services for the poor), which
purposes were often imposed on the firms by regulators.
46
Deregulation of electric utility services without some allowance for
recovery of these costs is arguably a regulatory taking, and is arguably
unwise, as it would impair otherwise vigorous market participants from
competing on a level playing field.' 47 Yet even in the for-profit utility firm
setting, the arguments for recognition of stranded costs are controversial. 48
144. It may be true that society would not have engaged in the historical level of expenditures on
some public and nonprofit facilities had it been known that they would become uneconomic. But to
continue to find such facilities, if it is true that less current finding could purchase like services
elsewhere, would be financially wasteful and an example of the common phenomenon of overvaluing
past, irreversible expenditures in present decision-making, sometimes known as the "sunk cost
fallacy." See DONALD RUTHERFORD, ED., DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 445 (1992) (defining "sunk
cost fallacy" as "[t]he mistaken view that a firm should take into account the fixed costs it has incurred
when deciding whether to continue with production.") In some circumstances, such wasteful spending
is not irrational, but merely uneconomic, as it serves the interests of some decision-makers to advance
their interests for "prestige, credibility, and the desire for personal vindication." 3 JOHN EATWELL Er
AL., THE NEw PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 950 (1987). Advancement of such interests,
however, seem to be beyond the statutory purposes of Medicaid. See supra text accompanying notes
34-38.
145. William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Stranded Costs, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 835,
835 (1995); see also Chopping Up America's Power: Deregulating the Power Industry, THE
ECONOMIST, May 3, 1997, at 21 ("Stranded costs are those investments made by utilities which are
expected to become uneconomic when competition is introduced and rates begin to fall. They include
nuclear plants (there are now much cheaper ways of generating electricity), and long-term contracts
with various alternative energy suppliers.").
146. See Baumol & Sidak, supra note 145, at 835.
147. See J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the
Regulatory Contract, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 851, 866-69 (1996).
148. See Stephen F. Williams, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the Regulatory Contract: A
Comment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1000 (1996); Oliver E. Williamson, Deregulatory Takings and Breach
of the Regulatory Contract: Some Precautions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1007 (1996); Ruth K. Kretschmer
& Robert Garcia, Recovering Stranded Costs: Not "If" but "How", FORTNIGHTLY, Jan. 15, 1997, at
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In the case of nonprofit or public health care institutions, however, the
argument falls flat. First, mission-driven providers, are concerned with
service, not profit, and they should not object to a shift that improves services
for their clients and patients, even if that shift harms their own institution.
Investors in firms, on the other hand, disclaim any interest in social mission,
and are interested only in return on their investment Second, the investors
arguably stand to lose something tangible if regulatory decisions bankrupt
their firm-they will lose their investment. In the public or nonprofit setting,
however, government is making decisions affecting either public or quasi-
public institutions, incorporated to serve a public function; therefore,
government may have a substantial claim of authority as to the continuing
use or disposition of these institutions' assets. 14 9 Ultimately, the managers of
neither public nor nonprofit facilities appear to have standing to object to a
shift in governmental policy that is beneficial to the facilities' patients or
clients, but is harmful to the facilities themselves.
In sum, supporters of essential community provider provisions must
advance the goal of current and future services to the medically indigent. The
purposes of Medicaid150 may have been well served in the past by mission-
driven essential community providers. However, any claim that they are
literally "essential" to fulfilling Medicaid's statutory mission should not be
taken on faith, but should be supported by persuasive argument. Those
arguments must take seriously the economic value to states in protecting the
managerial autonomy of Medicaid-participating HMOs. For whatever
reason,' 5 1 the historical Medicaid system dominated by fee for service
reimbursement and mission-driven providers has failed.152 It too often
provided poor care at high prices. 153 States, then, have some basis for moving
34.
149. See Donald Shriber, State Experience in Regulating a Changing Health Care System,
HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 48; Patricia Butler, State Policy Issues in Nonprofit Conversions,
HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 69; Eleanor Hamburger et al., The Pot of Gold: Monitoring Health
Care Conversions Can Yield Billions of Dollars for Health Care, 29 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 473, 474
(1995); Rob Atkinson, Reforming Cy Pres Reform, 44 HASTINGS L.. 1111, 1120 (1993); see also
Tamar Lewin & Martin Gottlieb, In Hospital Sales, an Overlooked Side Effect, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
1997, at Al.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 18-72.
151. To a certain extent, the fee-for-service Medicaid system was sandbagged, as the states simply
failed to maintain provider reimbursement levels (particularly for primary care physicians) at levels
sufficient to maintain a suitable network. See Blendon et al., supra note 10, at 138-41; Watson, supra
note 6; see also ERDMAN & WOLFE, supra note 6; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 103d CONG.,
1ST SESS., MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYSIS (A 1993 UPDATE) 343-54
(Comm. Print 1993).
152. See Blendon et al., supra note 10, at 13841; Watson, supra note 6.
153. See Rivera, supra note 89, at 106; see also Cynthia G. Tudor, Medicaid Expenditures and
State Responses, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Spring 1995, at 1; U.S. GAO, MEDICAID; supra note 81;
[VOL. 75:1431
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss4/5
HEALTH CARE COMMUNITY PROVIDERS
to privatize the management and financial oversight of Medicaid by
"contracting out" these management and oversight duties in Medicaid
managed care programs.
There are three compelling reasons to support essential community
provider provisions within the famework of Medicaid managed care: (1) the
willingness and ability of essential community providers to cost-shift for the
benefit of the medically indigent not covered by Medicaid; (2) the ability of
essential community providers to soften the harnful effects of information
asymmetries that plague consumers in the Medicaid managed care market;
and (3) the sluggishness of essential community providers' capital and the
market stability they therefore offer in changing economic times.
A. Cost-Shifting to Serve the Uninsured Poor
Arguments about the role of mission in modem health care often focus on
the willingness of firms to shift revenue from insured patients to finance
treatment for the uninsured. Medicaid covers only slightly more than half of
America's poor. 5 4 The plight of the uninsured has worsened in recent years
as competitive pressures limit community providers' ability to cost-shift.
Consequently, "the percentage of uninsured persons who lacked a usual
source of care, a traditional measure of access that facilitates entry into the
system, increased from 27.7 percent in 1977 to 35.9 percent in 1993. ''1 5 As
described below, cost-shifting for the benefit of the uninsured poor is an
appropriate statutory goal of a Medicaid program, and many nonprofits have
a history of and propensity for cost shifting. Although more efficient means
of providing care to the poor could easily be adopted, practical and political
constraints lead governments to fall back on the accepted method of cost-
shifting.
As described above, statutory, regulatory or contractual provisions
granting special preferences to essential community providers in Medicaid
managed care must be consistent with Medicaid's statutory purposes. 156 At
first blush, it might seem that cost-shifting to cover the care of the poor who
are not eligible for Medicaid coverage, while a socially appropriate goal, is
Note, supra note 89.
154. See KAISER COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF MEDICAID, MEDICAID FACTS I (February
1995) ("Although Medicaid has increasingly been used to expand coverage to the low-income
population, it covers only 58 percent of poor Americans.").
155. Peter J. Cunningham & Ha T. Tu, A Changing Picture of Uncompensated Care, HEALTH
AFF., July-Aug. 1997, at 167, 172.
156. Some extend their essential community provider provisions beyond Medicaid. Minnesota's
provision applies to all managed care organizations. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62Q.19 (West 1997).
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one beyond the statutory reach of Medicaid. 157 Unlike commercial insurance
plans, however, Medicaid has long been structured to provide reimbursement
not only for its own insureds, but also for a related group of low-income
uninsureds. Since 1981 Medicaid has provided, through the "disproportionate
share hospital" program, for enhanced reimbursement to fund hospitals'
service to non-Medicaid, uninsured patients. 58 Disproportionate share
payments are intended to "help hospitals, such as public and non-profit
hospitals, that serve needy patients. Because these facilities have high
Medicaid and uninsured caseloads, they are less able than other hosjpitals to
shift the costs of uncompensated care to privately insured patients."
5
Extending care to the poor, whether or not they are eligible for Medicaid,
is therefore a long-standing purpose of Medicaid. More particularly,
providing access to the uninsured poor is one of the driving forces behind
Medicaid managed care. A key component of many section 1115 waiver
programs is their extension of insurance coverage for the previously
uninsured poor and near-poor, although states' reach in this regard has
largely exceeded their grasp.' 60 States may be confronted with a large
residual uninsured population, and a diminished safety net of providers
damaged by their exclusion from selective HMO networks.161 Essential
community provider provisions in Medicaid managed care would help
minimize that danger.
There is evidence that nonprofit hospitals provide more charity care than
do for-profit hospitals. 62 The same holds true for nonprofits in other areas of
157. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
158. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-4 (1994); see also Linda E. Fishman & James D. Bentley, The
Evolution of Support for Safety-Net Hospitals, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1997, at 30, 35-37;
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK:
BACKGROUND DATA AND ANALYSIS (A 1993 UPDATE) 319-22 (Comm. Print 1993). The Balanced
Budget Act of 1997 preserved Medicaid funding of the disproportionate share hospital program,
although at modestly reduced levels. See Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, 444,4721 (to be codified
at42 U.S.C.'§ 1396L (1997)).
159. Leighton Ku & Teresa A. Coughlin, Medicaid Disproportionate Share and Other Special
Financing Programs, HEALTH CARE FIN. REV., Spring 1995, at 27, 29; see also Fishman & Bentley,
supra note 157, at 36-37; Sparer, supra note 11, at 446-47. Gail R. Wilensky, Health Care Reform: Is
1994 the Year?, 46 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEmp. L. 13, 26 (1994). In recent years it has become
increasingly true that hospitals serving a high proportion of Medicaid patients are shouldering a
proportionately larger uncompensated care burden. See Joyce M. Mann et al., A Profile of
Uncompensated Hospital Care, 1983-1995, HEALTH AFF., July-Aug. 1997, at 223,228-29.
160. See Medicaid: Spending Trends and the Move to Managed Care, PHYSICIAN PAYMENT
REVIEW COMM'N, ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 425 (1997); U.S. GAO, supra note 81, at 4; Holahan
et al., supra note 5, at 208; Riley, supra note 11, at 144-45.
161. See Note, supra note 55, at 762-64.
162. See Bradford H. Gray, Conversions of HMOs and Hospitals: What's At Stake?, HEALTH
AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 29, 39-40 (saying nonprofits provide marginally more charity care, and that
the amount of charity care varies from state to state); Altman & Shactman, supra note 142, at 798-99;
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health care delivery, such as home health care, nursing homes, and
psychiatric hospitals.163 These hospitals and other traditional Medicaid
providers will probably continue to cost-shift to provide care for the
uninsured for three reasons. First, many public and nonprofit facilities cost-
shift to provide care to the uninsured because such activity is within their
explicit mission.164 In addition, nonprofits are barred from distributing
PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT ASSESSMENT COMM'N, ANNUAL REP. TO CONGRESS 84 (1996); Mark A. Hall
& John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax
Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307, 352-53 (1991); Lawrence S. Lewin et al., Setting the Record
Straight: The Provision of Uncompensated Care by Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1212, 1213 (1988) (reporting study findings that "the perception that there is 'little or no difference' in
the provision of uncompensated care between investor-owned and not-for-profit hospitals is clearly
wrong"); see also Linda E. Fishman, What Types of Hospitals Form the Safety Net? HEALTH APF.,
July-Aug. 1997, at 215, 220-21 (finding top uncompensated care hospitals are divided equally between
government and nonprofit ownership).
Federal and state governments pay a price for the nonprofit status of these hospitals in the form of
taxes foregone. If the excess charity care is provided in nonprofit hospitals because they are accorded
nonprofit status, and if charity care is the sole or principal social benefit of this nonprofit status,
society may well not be driving a very hard bargain. See Hall and Colombo, supra, at 353-54. But see
Michael A. Morrisey et al., Do Nonprofit Hospitals Pay Their Way?, HEALTH AFF., Winter 1996, at
132, 137 ("On average, the [studied hospitals'] amount of uncompensated care, measured on a cost
basis, exceeded the tax subsidies by almost two to one."). As Hall and Colombo recognize, however,
there are other possible explanations for the grant of tax exemption. See Hall & Columbo, supra, at
354. In any event, it is not at all clear that nonprofits provide charity care as a quid pro quo for tax
exemption; they may instead provide it out of a sense of mission. In addition, efficiency is not the only
measure of a financing system for care for the poor. In the real world we sometimes make do with
systems that have social benefit regardless of their cost effectiveness. At any rate, there is very little
evidence that the grant or withholding of tax exempt status bears any causal relationship to the mix of
nonprofit and for-profit firms in the health care delivery system. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of
Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 882-83 (1980).
A recent study concluded that the conversion of hospitals from nonprofit to for-profit status did
not result in a fall-off in the amount of uncompensated care provided. See Gary J. Young et al., Does
the Sale of Nonprofit Hospitals Threaten Health Care for the Poor?, HEALTH AFF., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at
137-140. Yet the validity of this conclusion was significantly compromised by the fact that post-
acquision analysis was limited to a three-year period, and because "[i]n some acquisitions the
corporation agrees to maintain uncompensated care at its existing level for a specified period." Il at
141. The study, then, may have measured only whether for-profit successor corporations more or less
adhered to the regulatorily imposed requirement that they provide for some limited period the level of
uncompensated care provided by their predecessor nonprofits. The authors provided no reason to
believe that the levels of uncompensated care will continue beyond the required period.
163. See Theodore R. Marmor et al., Nonprofit Organizations and Health Care, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR, supra note 14 1, at 230-34.
164. See Schauffier & Wolin, supra note 9; Bruce Siegel, Public Hospitals-A Prescription for
Survival (Commonwealth Fund) (last modified Feb. 1998) visited July 30, 1997)
<http:/Iwww.cmwf.org/minority/siegel.html>; NATIONAL ASS'N OF PuBLIC HOSPITALS, AMERICA'S
URBAN HEALTH SAFErY NET, January 1994. Joel Weissman explains this shift as follows:
The debate may come down to attitude. For-profit hospitals are much more likely to have
policies that discourage admission of uninsured or Medicaid patients. When speaking of the for-
profit sector, a common sentiment among those in public and religiously affiliated hospitals is that
"they do by accident what we do on purpose."
Joel Weissman, Uncompensated Hospital Care: Will it Be There if We Need It?, 276 JAMA 823
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operating margin to owners or investors in the form of dividends or increased
share prices, and are therefore more likely to reinvest excess funds into
services, including services for the benefit of the broader community. 165
Finally, the "nonpecuniary rewards" available to nonprofit managers channel
their activities to areas by which their organizations' excellence can be
measured in terms other than profit, including but not limited to expanded
service to the uninsured of the community.
66
Essential community providers, then, will tend to leverage their
membership in Medicaid managed care networks to provide care for the
uninsured. Is this a legitimate reason for creating essential community
provider provisions in Medicaid managed care? It can be argued that this
indirect method of providing public funding for the care of the poor is more
clumsy and inefficient than simply creating a direct funding system, or
expanding Medicaid eligibility to encompass all of the poor 67 That is, it
may not be sufficient that some subset of nonprofit providers will more
readily cost-shift than for-profit institutions. Instead, as Mark Hall and John
Colombo have argued in a related context, the legitimacy of essential
community provider provisions might depend on whether the manipulation
of Medicaid managed care networks "represent[s] the most sensible vehicle
for support, that some form of direct grant might not more accurately
approximate the optimal level of support, or that direct government provision
of the same services is not preferable." 68 It is a fair question: why interfere
with management prerogatives of commercial HMOs, why manipulate an
insurance program to create an operating surplus for the benefit of the
uninsured, when direct payment for care of the currently uninsured would
almost certainly be more efficient? The short answer is that cost-shifting is an
achievable, politically acceptable method of financing care for America's
uninsured millions. There appears to be little political support for new
government social welfare programs, or for significant changes in the current
(1996) (footnote omitted).
165. See David Lawrence, Why We Want to Remain a Nonprofit Health Care Organization,
HEALTH AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 118, 119-20; Hansmann, supra note 162, at 838.
166. See Schlesinger, supra note 85, at 712-13.
167. This point is distinct from the analysis of whether the value of care nonprofits provide to the
uninsured equals the value of the taxes from which nonprofits are excused by virtue of their nonprofit
status-a question of some dispute in its own right. Compare Morrisey et al., supra note 162, at 141
(80% of California's nonprofits provide more value in charity care than they receive in tax benefit)
with Hall & Colombo, supra note 162, at 798-99 (saying "fragmentary evidence" suggests that
nonprofits gain more benefit from tax subsidies than they return in charity care); see also supra, note
162 and accompanying text.
168. Hall & Colombo, supra note 162, at 329.
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health financing system. 169 Funding for Medicaid itself is hardly secure, and
the program is sure to face increasing fiscal constraints in the future. 70 It is
difficult to imagine an interest group less likely to succeed in gaining an
extension of health financing than the poor and disabled uninsured who are
ineligible for Medicaid.171 Political leaders are caught in a vise: they face an
electorate distrustful of government programs, but have an implicit mandate
to ensure some minimal level of care for at least some segments of the poor.
In other words, care for the uninsured poor is important, and an indirect
system of finance, with a proven track record of service and largely in the
hands of a trusted non-profit sector may be the most "sensible vehicle"
available at this time.
172
Essential community provider provisions will advance Medicaid's
purpose of financing care for the uninsured poor. Essential community
providers, due to their mission, their nonprofit status, or both, are more likely
than for-profits to leverage the reimbursement they receive for services to
Medicaid-eligibles to finance care for those who are unable to afford care,
but are ineligible for Medicaid. This means of providing care for the indigent
relies upon flexibility within the Medicaid financing system, by which
marginally excessive payments are made for the care of the Medicaid-
eligible poor to provide resources to be shifted for the care of the poor who
are not Medicaid-eligible. The movement to Medicaid managed care reduces
169. See SKOCPOL, supra note 97, at 176-77; Daniel Yankelovich, The Debate That Wasn't: The
Public and the Clinton Plan, HEALTH AFF., Spring 1995, at 7, 15-17. Advances toward reducing the
high levels of uninsurance seem to be limited to children, the most politically appealing population
segment. See Robert Pear, G.O.P. Lawmakers Want $16 Billion for Health Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
1997, at Al.
170. See Charles Tiefer, "Budgetized" Health Entitlements and the Fiscal Constitution in
Congress's 1995-1996 Budget Battle, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 411, 421 (1996); Robert Kuttner, The
Either/Or Budget Fallacy, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1997, at A25; Editorial, Medicaid and the Governors,
WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1996, at A20. See generally infra Part I1.C.
171. See Karl Kronebusch, Medicaid and the Politics of Groups: Recipients, Providers, and
Policy Making, 22 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 839 (1997). See generally Herbert Hovenkamp,
Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 63, 108 (1990).
172. Moving from the political to the economic realm, this is an example of a "second best
problem," in which the admixture of regulated and unregulated, efficient and inefficient systems
makes it difficult to predict exactly the effect any isolated attempt to foster small-scale efficiency will
have on overall efficiency. See Ronald H. Coase, Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 201 (1978), reprinted in READINGS IN THE ECONOMICS OF LAW AND REGULATION 3, 21 (A.L
Ogus & C.G. Velanovski eds., 1984). Coase writes:
In an imperfect world where some sectors of the economy persistently and irremediably deviate
from efficiency it will no longer be true that fostering efficiency in other sectors will maximize
economic efficiency. The constraint imposed by deviant sectors of the economy must be taken
into consideration and this will require immensely complex, if not impossible, calculations to
determine the optimal policy. This is known as the problem of the "second best."
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this flexibility, perhaps a great deal, as disproportionate share funding is
diverted from safety-net hospitals to expand Medicaid eligibility. 173 States
show little inclination to muster the funding and political will to create a new
program of universal coverage for the poor, and cost-shifting must, in the
meantime, remain an important part of the safety net.
B. Information Asymmetries and Trust of Mission-Driven Providers
The ability of essential community providers to counteract the effects of
significant market imperfections in the Medicaid managed care system also
justifies their inclusion in Medicaid networks.174 Essential community
providers serve two functions in this regard: they provide safe havens with
traditional Medicaid providers for those beneficiaries troubled by provider
change, and they provide benchmarks of patient-centered care to improve the
effects of intra-plan competition on the development of care appropriate to
poor patients. 175 In this way, essential community providers can ameliorate
the effects of information asymmetries that prevent Medicaid managed care
programs from performing as truly efficient markets.
Economists generally agree that goods and services are efficiently
provided in well-functioning markets by for-profit firms, and that nonprofits
occupy a significant place in commercial markets176 as a result of market
failures. 177 More particularly,
[W]hen certain conditions are satisfied, profit-seeking firms will
173. See Marsha Gold, Markets and Public Programs: Insights from Oregon and Tennessee, 22 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 633, 662-63 (1997).
174. See Freund & Hurley, supra note 11, at 492.
175. See infra text accompanying notes 226-27.
176. "Commercial market," a term borrowed from Henry Hansmann, refers to a market in which
participating firms receive most or all of their income in exchange for the goods or services they
provide. See Hansmann, supra note 162, at 840-41.
177. As market failures diminish (i.e., when markets "mature"), for-profits should come to
dominate. But "commercial" (as opposed to "donative," see Hansmann, supra note 162, at 840, 862)
nonprofits continue to dominate the market for hospital services. See Claxton et al., supra note 85, at
12. This continued dominance of nonprofits could be attributed to "inertia and tradition," see
Hansmann, supra note 162, at 867; to the market advantage of nonprofits attributable to their "tax
subsidy," see Michael E. Herbert, A For-Profit Health Plan's Experience and Strategy, HEALTH APP.,
Mar.-Apr. 1997, at 121, 123; Hall & Colombo, supra note 162, at 310-11; or to the continuing
presence of market failure in the form of information asymmetries. "Inertia and tradition" are hardly
powerful long-term factors in market dynamics, and yet nonprofit hospitals persist. Further, there is no
evidence that the tax benefit experienced by nonprofit hospitals outweighs their larger charitable
activity, see Morrisey et al., supra note 162, at least to a degree that the marginal benefit could not be
overcome by the presumed efficiency superiority of the for-profit form. It is therefore reasonable to
infer continuing market failure in the hospital market and other institutional health care markets
characterized by continuing substantial nonprofit presence.
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supply goods and services at the quantity and price that represent
maximum social efficiency. Among the most important of these
conditions is that consumers can, without undue cost or effort, (a)
make a reasonably accurate comparison of the products and prices of
different firms before any purchase is made, (b) reach a clear
agreement with the chosen firm concerning the goods or services that
the firm is to provide and the price to be paid, and (c) determine
subsequently whether the firm complied with the resulting agreement
and obtain redress if it did not.
178
These conditions all concern the availability and use of information. When
sufficient information is available to permit consumers to evaluate a service,
bargain for it, and evaluate the performance of its provision, consumers can
fend for themselves against self-interested and profit-seeking firms. When
appropriate information is not available because, for example, it is difficult to
define goals and measure results, 179 or when desired performance cannot be
tied to explicit contractual specifications,'80 nonprofits serve a positive
consumer protection role in the marketplace. 18  Health care markets are
"characterized by serious informational asymmetries because of the
vulnerabilities of patients and the use of third-party payment." 182 The market
for medical care is highly imperfect in two separate but related ways: first,
there is a yawning gap of technical knowledge between the sellers of the
services and the ultimate consumers, 8 3 and second, "[t]he importance of
these asymmetries is heightened by the emotional associations of life-saving
treatment and the traumas of injury and dread disease."' 184 The lack of
information and oversight of quality is of particular concern in Medicaid
managed care systems.1
5
178. Hansmann, supra note 162, at 843 (footnote omitted).
179. See KETTL, supra note 87, at 37-40.
180. See Benedick, supra note 87, at 113.
181. See HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP oF ENTERPRISE 233-34 (1996); Schlesinger et al.,
supra note 85, at 713. Hansmann, supra note 162, at 29, 36.
182. Gray, supra note 162, at 29,36.
183. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Preserving Community in Health Care, 22 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 147, 157 (1997).
184. Marmor et al., supra note 163, at 221,223.
185. See 1997 PPRC REPORT, supra note 74, at 439-52; Gold et al., supra note 85, at 158-59;
Sparer, supra note 11, at 456-57; see also Freund & Hurley, supra note 11, at 492. Freund and Hurley
warn:
The potential for problems [with managed care plans] is intensified for Medicaid. Beneficiaries,
by definition, lack the financial means to go "out of network" to obtain desired care. Legitimate
concerns exist about the geographical, cultural, and linguistic accessibility of prepaid health plans
whose traditional members have not been economically disadvantaged or drawn from ethnic
minorities. Finally, the special medical needs of these populations, such as early intervention
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It has been argued in the past that physicians acting as "very sophisticated
purchasing agent[s]" for consumers ameliorate these information
asymmetries. 186 While consumers are unable to compare products, bargain
for services, or monitor quality, some believe their physicians, acting as
quasi-fiduciary agents, are able and willing to serve that role. Therefore,
consumers, through their agents, are fully able to fend for themselves in
dealings with self-interested for-profit firms.
Physicians, by virtue of their professionalism, superior knowledge, and
relational position of trust, have been seen as leveling the playing field
between consumers and health care institutions. 187 Yet if this rosy picture of
physician agency was ever true, 188 it is no longer. Modem physicians are
entrepreneurs, involved in a wide range of business activities apparently at
odds with a vision of detached professional attention to patient welfare.'8 9 In
addition to conflicts arising from physicians' own business activities, their
contracts with managed care organizations often include financial incentives
that at least appear to conflict with an ethic of fidelity to patient welfare. 90
While managed care financing mechanisms do not invariably interfere with
physicians' loyalty to their patients,19' changing economic relationships at
least call into question any reliance on physician agency as a cure to the
programs for child health or outreach-based prenatal care services, may demand services and
practitioners lacking in both new and existing prepaid plans.
1d.
186. Hansmann, supra note 162, at 866.
187. The ethical strictures of the medical profession contemplate that physicians will play this
agency role for their patients. See Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Ethical and Legal Standards for
Physicians be Changed to Accommodate New Models for Rationing Health Care?, 140 U. PA. L. REV.
1809, 1816 n.18 (1992) (quoting the American Medical Association's Code of Medical Ethics, which
indicates a "physician has a duty to do all that he or she can for the benefit of the individual patient"
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MED. ASS'N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 3
op. 2.03 (1992)); GRAY, supra note 1, at 166-67 ("Physicians are expected not only to maintain
considerable technical competence but also to be faithful to the interests of their patients"). Physicians
are required as a matter of common law to be faithful to this quasi-fiduciary duty in disclosing risks of
procedures to patients, see, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v.
Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972), and in avoiding or disclosing financial conflicts of interest. See, e.g.,
Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 605-07 (Cal. 1993); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d
479,483 (Cal. 1990). See generally JAY KAf, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984)
(arguing that physicians owe broad duties of fidelity to patients).
188. See RODWIN, supra note 1, at 1-8; GRAY, supra note 1, at 172-74; STARR, supra note 19, at
21-24.
189. See GRAY, supra note 1, at 202-03.
190. See John V. Jacobi, Patients at a Loss: Protecting Health Care Consumers Through Data
Driven Quality Assurance, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 705, 720-22 (1997); Marc A. Rodwin, Strains in the
Fiduciary Metaphor: Divided Physician Loyalties and Obligations in the Changing Health Care
System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 241,253 (1995); RODWIN, supra note 1, at 8-11.
191. See Emanuel & Dubler, supra note 1, at 326-27; Kate T. Christensen, Ethically Important
Distinctions Among Managed Care Organizations, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 223,225-26 (1995).
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information asymmetries that plague consumers in the health care delivery
system.
192
Improved methods of independent quality assessment also offer some
promise in closing this information gap. Paul Ellwood, in his Shattuck lecture
in 1988, prescribed improved data gathering, analysis, and distribution as the
cure for patient information asymmetries.193 Others have suggested that
developing independent analytic methods will permit direct assessment of the
quality of health care, thereby eliminating at least one reason for the
continued presence of nonprofits in the health care delivery system.
194
Developing technologies offer promise, but they will not in the near
future permit lay consumers independently to assess the quality of
professional care in medical care generally, 195 or in Medicaid managed care
systems in particular. 196 Almost a decade after his Shattuck lecture, Paul
Ellwood has observed that competitive developments in the health care
industry have focused on cost to the exclusion of quality, that consumers
have no means to compare the quality of providers or plans, and that as a
result, consumers are losing trust in their health care providers.1
97
The unabated information asymmetries in health care delivery systems in
general, and in Medicaid managed care in particular, 198 then, explain the
continuing importance of nonprofit participation. At a minimum, the
prohibition against nonprofits' distribution of operating surplus in the form of
profits provides some assurance against their exploitation of their patients'
vulnerability. 199 This reduced ability to profit from information superiority is
a source of trust in nonprofits.2° The general trustworthiness of nonprofits
192. See E. Haavi Morreim, Redefining Quality by Reassigning Responsibility, 20 AM. J.L. &
MED. 79, 92 (1994); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Necessary and Proper Role of Regulation to Assure
the Quality of Health Care, 25 HOUs. L. REV. 525,535-38 (1988).
193. Paul M. Ellwood, Shattuck Lecture-Outcomes Management: A Technology of Patient
Experience, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1549, 1550 (1988).
194. See GRAY, supra note 1, at 345-47; Pauly, supra note 3, at 235.
195. See Wendy K, Mariner, Outcomes Assessment in Health Care Reform: Promise and
Limitations, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 37 (1994); see also Jacobi, supra note 190, at 768-69; Jesse Green,
Problems in the Use of Outcome Statistics to Compare Health Care Providers, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 55
(1992).
196. See John E. Ware, Jr., et al., Comparison of Health Outcomes at a Health Maintenance
Organization with Those of Fee-For-Service Care, 1986 LANCET 1017 (reporting study results
demonstrating better health results for high-income than low income HMO members in a fee-for-
services system); see also Freund & Hurley, supra note 11, at 494; Rosenblatt, supra note 67, at 919-
20.
197. See Plans. Providers, Consumers Need Meaningful Data to Help Restore Trust, Ellwood
Says, 3 MANAGED CARE REP. 522 (1997).
198. See Lipson, supra note 85, at 92.
199. See Schlesinger et al., supra note 85, at 713; HANSMANN, supra note 181, at 234.
200. See Schlesinger et al., supra note 85, at 715; Hansmann, supra note 162, at 862-63; BURTON
1997] 1467
Washington University Open Scholarship
1468 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
emanates from other sources as well. Health care nonprofits may be regarded
as trustworthy because they may include community members on their
boards,201 because they may be geographically concentrated and attuned to
local concerns, 20 2 or because their caregivers are more familiar with and
sensitive to the language and cultural differences of their community.
203
Further, the corporate mission of the nonprofits may evidence a mission
inconsistent with the nonprofits' taking advantage of their clients; that is, if
an institution is well-known for its willingness to moderate fees on the basis
of a patient's ability to pay, or to affirmatively reach out to serve the health
care needs of a poverty population, its motives may be understood to extend
beyond profit
204
The conditional tone of the above description is intentional: the evidence
of the difference between nonprofit and for-profit institutions is suggestive,
but hardly conclusive. Three policy responses to the evident difference
between entrepreneurial and mission-driven providers are available to states:
requiring contracting managed care organizations to subcontract only with
nonprofits and other suitably qualified essential community providers;
205
permitting managed care organizations to decline entirely to subcontract with
essential community providers; or requiring managed care organizations to
permit essential community providers nonexclusive entry into the Medicaid
managed care network.
The evidence seems too thin to warrant the first response. To limit
managed care organizations to a sharply limited pool of institutional
providers would so restrain their ability to contract selectively as to
eviscerate the cost-savings potential of Medicaid managed care.206 Also, the
states' motivating force for seeking Medicaid managed care waivers is after
all a reduction in program cost 20 7 On the other hand, the arguments that there
are genuine consumer protection benefits in maintaining a place in the
Medicaid marketplace for mission-driven providers seem strong enough to
reject the second option, so long as the cost of restricting the managed care
organizations' contracting freedom is not too great The cost of this option is
limited, as essential community providers could be included in the networks
A. WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 124 (1988).
201. See Lawrence, supra note 165, at 199.
202. See Benedick, supra note 87, at 115.
203. See Note, supra note 55, at 1635.
204. See Larkin, supra note 8; Heuer, supra note 7.
205. Public hospitals, for example, are governmental and not nonprofit entities, but they fit within
most formulations of the term essential community provider. See supra note 14.
206. See supra note 139.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 79, 83.
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under the same terms as other providers, °8 and as nonprofits appear to
operate at efficiencies similar to that of for-profits in competitive
marketplaces.2 9
A sensible policy response to the information asymmetries in Medicaid
managed care, then, is to mandate the non-exclusive inclusion of essential
community providers in managed care organizations' provider networks.
Essential community providers can serve an important function in Medicaid
managed care programs by moderating the potential harm posed to patients
by the market's imperfections. The market for health care, and in particular,
the market for health care provided to Medicaid beneficiaries, simply cannot
be relied upon to provide value to patients. The additional trustworthiness
possessed by nonprofits and other mission-driven providers, if they are given
access to managed care networks through essential community provider
provisions, allows them to provide a needed measure of consumer protection
by serving a mediating function in Medicaid managed care.
210
One of the complexities in the market for medical care is the confusion in
identifying the "consumer." The functional "consumer" for medical care
services, the person or entity who chooses the "products," (including the
health care provider, institutions and plans) has been identified variously as
the patient, the physician, and the third-party payor. As described above,
physicians are now hampered in serving as a consumer proxy by virtue of the
entrepreneurial and behavior-shaping activities of the modem health care
delivery system.211 This leaves the patient and the third-party payor-in this
context, state Medicaid agencies. The mandated inclusion of essential
community providers in Medicaid managed care plans addresses significant
information asymmetries from the perspectives of both "consumers." From
the perspective of individual Medicaid beneficiaries, essential community
providers serve as "safe havens." From the perspective of Medicaid agencies,
they serve as "benchmarks."
From the individual beneficiary's perspective, essential community
providers serve the classic role of nonprofits in imperfect markets: they
208. See supra text accompanying notes 132-34.
209. See HANSMANN, supra note 181, at 239 ("[N]onprofit firms often appear to be managed with
substantial efficiency when, as is often the case, they operate in a competitive environment"); Paul .
DiMaggio & Helmut I- Anheier, The Sociology of Nonprofit Organizations and Sectors, 16 ANN.
Ray. Soc. 137, 147 (1990) ("Contrairy to orthodox economic theory, research on hospitals reports that
[nonprofits] are less expensive (in per-diem patient cost) and thus ostensibly more efficient than [for-
profits]"). But see WEISBROD, supra note 200, at 48-53 (suggesting the measurement of cost efficiency
of service provision in the nonprofit sector-including hospitals--is difficult to measure and often
becomes distorted).
210. See Benedick, supra note 87, at 115.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 188-92.
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provide a trustworthy safe haven in a market where the beneficiaries are
unable independently to obtain or assess information on the quality or
adequacy of provider services.2 12 As described above,213 when Medicaid
devolved from a program offering "mainstream" health access to one
offering a "decent minimum" of care, a cadre of specialized Medicaid
providers developed. This netvork of specialized providers was not a
satisfactory substitute for the full range of health care providers available to
privately insured persons,21 4 but it did include a large number of
extraordinarily dedicated providers particularly skilled at addressing the
needs of the poor.215 In light of the flaws at least potentially present in the
marketplace created by Medicaid waiver programs, it is minimally intrusive
to maintain some access to those providers with whom Medicaid
beneficiaries have direct experience. If the other providers available in the
network are unable to establish their trustworthiness, beneficiaries can fall
back on the mission-driven, historically dedicated provider.
The second, and perhaps more important role of essential community
provider provisions is their ability to create market "benchmarks" for the
appropriate provision of services in Medicaid managed care. Managed care
waiver programs proceed on the assumption that the Medicaid system can be
improved not only by the privatization of financing and network
development, but also by the introduction into Medicaid of a broad array of
providers previously excluded by inadequacies of the reimbursement
structure in the fee-for-service system. That is, Medicaid managed care
attempts to restore Medicaid as a "mainstream" program, in which Medicaid
beneficiaries have access to the same array of providers available to privately
insured patients.2 16 Essential community provider provisions ought not
frustrate that goal, and there is no reason to believe they will. Rather,
essential community provider provisions will correct for market
imperfections created by the third-party payor status of Medicaid agencies.
As third-party payors, Medicaid agencies have oversight and quality
control responsibilities that place them in the position of consumer proxies.2 17
They are, however, separated from the actual provision of services, and
therefore have difficulty assessing the adequacy and quality of the actual
212. See supra text accompanying notes 199-200.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 18-72.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 50-56.
215. See Note, supra note 55, at 1635.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
217. See Freund & Hurley, supra note 11, at 491-92. The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 adds some
modest consumer protection elements to the federal requirements for Medicaid managed care. See Pub.
L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251, § 4707 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396u-2 (1997)).
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services rendered. Medicaid managed care rejects the traditional method of
dealing with the separation of payor and recipient of services-reliance on
nonprofit providers2 t---and instead relies on another strategy: managed
competition. Managed competition is a mechanism designed to introduce
microeconomic principles into the provision of health care so that quality
accountability may increase while costs are contained.21 9 Managed
competition encourages health care plans and providers to compete for
market share within a regulatory framework. Although the competition is
expected to be fullest at the plan level,220 the competition among the
providers within the plan can also have the salutary effect of providing
incentives for physicians and institutions to compete on the basis of quality
and patient satisfaction.221 In this fiamework, managed care organization
members are permitted to "shop" for physicians and institutions within their
plan, and can thereby "vote with their feet," patronizing providers within
managed care organizations that meet their particular needs.
This expressed consumer preference mechanism supplements the states'
centralized control of provider quality. Medicaid managed care is a
privatization of Medicaid financing and network maintenance. The agencies
can specify and monitor a great number of contract terms, e.g., credentials of
physicians,tm geographic distribution of providers, 223 and timeliness of
218. See HANSMANN, supra note 181, at229-30.
219. See Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, HEALTH AFF.,
Supp. 1993, at 24,29.
220. See id
221. See Jacobi, supra note 190, at 774-75.
222. Pennsylvania's request for proposal to IMOs requires the primary care physicians in some
specialties to be board-certified or board-eligible. See Pennsylvania RFP, at 64-66, reprinted in 2
ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 84, at 3-50, 3-5 1. Missouri's request for proposal to IMOs required
that each plan "designate a quality assurance and utilization manager coordinator" who is "board-
certified or board-eligible in his or her field of specialty." Missouri RFP, at 35-38, reprinted in 2
ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 84, at 5-38.
223. New Jersey's contract with IMOs is very specific in describing the requisite geographic
distribution of primary care physicians, clinical nurse practitioners, and clinical nurse specialists:
Access Standards
1.90% of the members must be within 6 miles of 2 [primary care physicians] in an urban
setting.
2. 85% of the members must be within 15 miles of 2 [primary care physicians] in a rural
setting.
3. Covering physicians must be within 15 miles in urban areas and 25 miles in rural areas.
Travel Time Standards
In a mandatory program, the managed care provider must adhere to the 30 minute standard, ie.,
enrollees will not live more than 30 minutes away from their [primary care providers or clinical
nurse practitioners/clinical nurse specialists]. The following guidelines are to be used in
determining travel time.
1. Normal conditions/primary roads- 20 miles
2. Rural or mountainous areas/secondary roads- 15 miles
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service.Y4 It is difficult or impossible, however, for them to specify or
monitor the cultural or community sensitivity of the providers, or thoughtful
and caring attention to the special needs of a poverty population. Mission-
driven providers are likely to bring these attributes to the network. Medicaid
beneficiaries are likely to display preferences for providers who demonstrate
those attributes.22 To compete within networks, other providers will be
inclined to emulate the attributes of essential community providers that
Medicaid beneficiaries find attractive. Essential community provider
provisions, therefore, permit Medicaid agencies to encourage, through intra-
plan competition, qualities of services that are difficult or impossible to
mandate as a matter of contract
Essential community provider provisions, then, correct for information
asymmetries from two different perspectives, corresponding to the two
different "consumers" present in Medicaid managed care programs. From the
individual Medicaid beneficiary's perspective, they correct for difficulties in
judging the quality of providers by providing a "safe haven" with mission-
driven providers. From the Medicaid agency's perspective, essential
community provider provisions compensate for their remoteness from the
actual provision of care, and their inability to specify or monitor by contract
important aspects of medical care. Essential community provider provisions
permit Medicaid managed care programs to create "benchmarks" for
culturally and socially appropriate care that will, through microeconomic
pressure, raise the level of treatment throughout the network. Essential
community provider provisions, therefore, somewhat paradoxically use
3. Flat areas or areas connected by interstate highways - 25 miles
4. Metropolitan areas such as Newark, Camden, Trenton, Paterson, Jersey City, - 30 minutes
travel time by public transportation OR no more than 2-6 miles from [primary care provider] ....
New Jersey Contract, Appendix L, pp. 4-5, reprinted in 2 ROSENBAUM Er AL., supra note 84, at 3-283,
3-284. The Missouri RFP sets the maximum travel distance for hospitals at 20 miles, but further
provides: "The twenty (20) mile distance standard shall not apply in rural areas where the usual and
customary is longer. (Usual and customary is access that is equal to the current existing practice for the
non-Medicaid population.) The distance standard shall be the usual and customary for the area."
Missouri RFP, at 29, reprinted in 2 ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 84, at 3-280. The Nebraska
contract with HMOs requires "access to one or more affiliated [primary care providers] within a 20
mile radius or 45 minutes from [the client's] home." Nebraska Contract, at 11, reprinted in 2
ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 84, at 3-281.
224. Vermont's request for proposals to HMOs requires that "[a]ppointments made on referral to
specialty medical services shall not exceed 30 days for routine care." Vermont RFP at 2-34, reprinted
in 2 ROSENBAUM Er AL., supra note 84, at 3-266. New Jersey's contract requires scheduling of
"regular dental appointments" within three weeks. See New Jersey Contract, App. 2, at 5, reprinted in
2 ROSENBAUM Er AL., supra note 84, at 3-251. Nebraska's contract requires that "[c]lients shall be
seen by a physician within three weeks of having a positive pregnancy test and requesting an
appointment." Nebraska Contract at 24, reprinted in 2 ROSENBAUM ET AL., supra note 84, at 3-246.
225. See Lipson, supra note 84, at 91, 94-95.
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competitive market forces to ameliorate the market defects in the Medicaid
managed care system.
C. The Value of Stability: Mission, "Capital Lock" and Nonprofit Form
Institutional stability is of great benefit in health care generally and in the
delivery of Medicaid services in particular. It is at least disturbing, and can be
counter-therapeutic, when patients are forced to change health care
providers. 6 Providers that make a commitment to a system, to a community,
and to patients are therefore more valuable than providers less likely to
maintain continuous relationships. In this regard mission-driven providers
offer benefits beyond their entrepreneurial competitors: their provision of
services does not depend on a continued favorable assessment of the
profitability of such activity, but on an ideological motivation to serve
patients or society through health care delivery.227 For-profit enterprises, on
the other hand, will maintain a relationship with a community or group of
patients so long as that relationship is economically advantageous. The
choice between financial and mission-based motivation in health care
delivery makes a difference in terms of commitment to a community.
A commitment to the community sufficient to weather bad times is
evident, for example, in the Lawndale Christian Health Center, located on the
West Side of Chicago. Lawndale serves about one thousand patients each
226. Continuity of professional relationships in health care permit caregivers to understand aspects
of a patients' health needs better, including "particular reactions to their diseases, their social support
systems, their tolerance for pain and disability, the effect of their illness on their work and interests,
and their general values and preferences regarding medical care." Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Allan S. Brett,
Managed Competition and the Physician-Patient Relationship, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 879, 880
(1993); see also Bryan A. Liang, Deselection Under Harper v. Healthsource: A Blow for Maintaining
Patient-Physician Relationships in the Era of Managed Care?, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 799, 855-56
(1997); David Orentlicher, Health Care Reform and the Patient-Physician Relationship, 5 HEALTH
MATRiX 141, 143 (1995); Dana Gelb Safran et al., Primary Care Perfornance in Fee-for-Service and
Prepaid Health Care Systems: Results from the Medical Outcomes Study, 271 JAMA 1579, 1584
(1994); Paula Berg, Judicial Enforcement of Covenants Not To Compete Between Physicians:
Protecting Doctors' Interests at Patients' Expense, 45 RUTGERs L. REv. 1, 30-36 (1992).
227. This is an important, if perhaps obvious, point. Estelle James and Susan Rose-Ackerman
argue that ideological mission is the single most important factor in predicting the success of a
nonprofit firm, or of nonprofit firms in an economic sector
We believe that a key feature of nonprofit production is ideology. This may stem from religious
faith, from a secular vision of a just society, from a belief in a particular theory of education or
child development, to a name just a few possible sources .... [M]any organizations are nonprofit
because their founders have a set of strongly felt beliefs which motivate them more than money
alone. The kind of services they chose to produce, the consumers who prefer these services, as
well as the [nonprofit organization] fundraising efforts are directly tied to the founders' beliefs.
ESTELLE JAMES & SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, THE NONPROFIT ENTERPRISE IN MARKET ECONOMICS
51(1986).
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week, almost all of whom are either African-American or Mexican-
American.228 About 60% of its patients are on Medicaid, 15% on Medicare,
and 25% uninsured, who either pay on a sliding scale or perform labor in
return for services. 229 The Center is a project of a church, and has operated in
the community for 13 years. The physicians receive sharply below-market
salaries, but few have left the practice, except to undertake overseas medical
missionary work.230 The Center has extensive programs for outreach, social
work and case management, and has installed a physician's office in a local
public aid office.23' Most of the staff lives in the community. 2
Religious organizations have no monopoly on such community-centered
care providers. The Sixteenth Street Community Health Center has served
the near South Side of Milwaukee for twenty-six years, and has developed a
reputation for providing high-quality care to the mixed population, which
includes English speakers, as well as those who speak only Spanish or
Hmong.233 It serves patients with public, private, and no insurance, provides
social services and case management in addition to traditional medical care,
and increasingly relies on cost-shifting to cover the expenses of the
uninsured.
234
Those who run for-profit entities are not devoid of humanitarian impulse,
but the depth of a for-profit enterprise's commitment to a community can be
measured in terms of return on investment The attraction of institutions such
as Lawndale and the Sixteenth Street Community Health Center can be
attributed in part to romance, but they are essential community providers
because they are genuinely committed to serving the uninsured, and their
communities believe in and trust them.235 But they are essential community
providers also because they are dedicated to their communities, and their
missions will permit or compel them to find a way to continue to provide
services notwithstanding shifts in funding and reimbursement policies. It is
simply beyond comprehension that the organizations would shift their
resources to a more remunerative venture.
Leaving aside the staying power derived from organizational mission,
nonprofit corporate status in itself fosters a stable community presence. This
228. See Heuer, supra note 7.
229. See id
230. See id The physicians are paid $60,000 per year, far below the going rate. They are selected
from among residents who rotate through the Center during their medical education. See id.
231. See id
232. See id
233. See Larin, supra note 8.
234. See id
235. See supra Parts Il.A.-B.
[VOL. 75:1431
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss4/5
HEALTH CARE COMMUNITY PROVIDERS
stability derives from a circumstance that is otherwise thought to be a
drawback to the nonprofit form: its reliance on debt financing, and its
inability to gain access to equity markets. Debt financing is less nimble than
equity financing, and nonprofit firms are therefore slower to react to shifts in
market conditions. Although this inhibits nonprofits' ability to expand
rapidly in response to surges in funding and demand, it also permits them-
or requires them-to continue in place in slumping markets, when
entrepreneurial capital has sought more favorable placements. As Henry
Hansmann describes:
Nonprofit firms, by definition, are incapable of obtaining equity
capital. Instead, they must rely upon debt, donations, and retained
earnings as sources of capital. These sources are generally less
responsive than equity capital to rapid increases in demand....
... [W]hen demand declines, nonprofit firms have much less
incentive and opportunity than investor-owned firms to reduce their
investment in the industry. A nonprofit firm need not-indeed,
cannot-pay any return on its net capital (that is, the capital that the
firm has acquired over time through donations and retained earnings).
Consequently, even in the absence of any direct or indirect subsidies
(such as tax exemption), a nonprofit firm can remain in operation at its
current scale as long as its revenues are sufficient to cover
depreciation-that is, sufficient to earn just a zero net rate of return. 36
Nonprofit firms, then, weather bad financial times for reasons that go beyond
mission. They are able to survive on a minimal or nonexistent operating
margin, as they need not satisfy investors with a return on investment Their
debt financing and nonprofit status also inhibit their ability to dispose of
assets or shift to another type of business.237 In contrast for-profit health care
providers can more readily enter or exit a particular business, transfer
ownership, and reorganize.233
The staying power of essential community providers has important
implications in Medicaid managed care. Currently, while managed care
organizations and their subcontractors are generally faring well from
Medicaid payments, there is competition for a share of the market. As state
governments develop experience in managed care contracting in the
Medicaid market, and as they become more sophisticated in pricing the
services, they will surely apply price pressure to managed care organizations,
236. See HANSMANN, supra note 181, at240.
237. GRAY, supra note 1, at 109-10.
238. See id. 50-52.
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and through them, to the subcontracting health care providers. In some states,
the reimbursement level for Medicaid managed care is already far below that
for commercially insured members.239 To ensure that they obtain the best
rates, states are increasingly subjecting Medicaid managed care contracting
to competitive bidding, thereby driving down the level of payment to
managed care plans.240
Even as states move more of the Medicaid population to managed care,
they will face increasing pressures to reduce costs, and thus to squeeze much
of the operating margin out of the program. Recent efforts to move toward a
balanced federal budget have directly targeted Medicaid funding.241 In
addition, Congress has moved to broadly modify the "entitlement" nature of
some cash benefit programs; similar shifts in the treatment by the
appropriations process of Medicaid are on the horizon.242 As a result,
Medicaid funding will not be buffered from the annual budget process.
Instead, advocates for Medicaid funding will be forced to compete with
interest groups championing their own spending programs in each budget
cycle.243 In that process, Medicaid faces some substantial hurdles. In the
interest group battle for funding, Medicaid will be relatively disfavored
because, unlike Medicare, it is seen as a "welfare" and not an "insurance"
program, and because its beneficiaries-the poor and disabled-are less
powerful than the champions of, for example, Medicare, which benefits the
middle class elderly.244
At the very least, funding for Medicaid will suffer cyclical periods of
slashed spending. During those periods, the mission-driven motivations of
essential community providers will provide powerful incentives for them to
stay the course while less committed providers fold their tents. In addition,
the sluggishness of nonprofits' funding-their "capital immobility" 24 5-
which is a systemic detriment to their ready expansion in boom times, will
prove a systemic asset in times of funding downturns. Nonprofits, unable to
distribute profits, can operate on zero margin. In addition, terms and
conditions on their debt, as well as their managers' interest in maintaining
their institutional positions, may incline them to continue to provide services
239. See Sparer, supra note 11, at451.
240. See 1997 PPRC REPORT, supra note 74, at 443-44; Illinois to Rebid HMO Contracts While
Awaiting Federal Approval, MANAGED CARE REP., Apr. 9, 1997, at 345-46.
241. See Robert Cohen, Congress on Verge of Cutting Medicare: Hospitals Would Lose
Reimbursement Funds, THE STAR-LEDGER, July 21, 1997, at 1.
242. See Tiefer, supra note 170, at 413-14.
243. Seeid. at 418-20.
244. See id. at 420-21.
245. HANSMANN, supra note 181, at240.
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even in the face of reduced funding.246
The inclusion of mission-driven, capital-locked providers in Medicaid
managed care networks, then, will stabilize the provider network over time.
These providers will be more likely to remain in the business of providing
services to Medicaid managed care beneficiaries even when fiscal pressures
would likely drive profit-seeking firms to move their capital to other, more
lucrative ventures. The values of continuity of care and maintenance of
steady supplies of service providers therefore support the enforcement of
essential community provider provisions.
CONCLUSION
Mission does matter in the context of health care for poor people. Funding
streams for the poor can be stretched to provide care for the near-poor, and
mission-driven providers are more likely to use their marginal revenue to do
so than are entrepreneurs. Health care delivery for the poor exists in a highly
imperfect marketplace, and the information asymmetries preventing
Medicaid beneficiaries from acting as fully-informed consumers can be
partially counteracted by giving mission-driven providers a guaranteed place
in the managed care network. There, they will serve both as safe havens,
providing at least some residual source of historical Medicaid care, and as
benchmarks in culturally appropriate, patient-centered care, that intra-plan
competitors must achieve in order to retain market share. Finally, nonprofit
providers, due to their debt-financing and their corporate mission, are slower
to respond to shifts in financing, and therefore are less likely to abandon the
Medicaid marketplace when Medicaid funding is cut back.
States' Medicaid managed care programs are pursued primarily for their
promise of cost-savings. But they offer the opportunity to increase the
availability of providers-particularly primary care providers-for the
program's beneficiaries. Medicaid managed care offers the promise of
moving Medicaid in the long-favored direction of "mainstreaming" the poor
into America's health care system. Mainstreaming is a worthy goal, but its
careless pursuit could jeopardize the too-small but extremely valuable
network of mission driven, essential community providers motivated by a
long-term commitment to patient-centered care for the poor. Limited
protection of essential community providers in Medicaid managed care
statutes and contracts strikes the proper mix between cost-savings and care




Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol75/iss4/5
